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INTRODUCTION
Interpretive methodology lies at the core of the Supreme Court's
persistent modern debate about statutoryinterpretation. 1 Supreme
Court Justices have applied two fundamentally different methods
of interpretation. One is the formalist method,' which seeks to
promote rule-of-law values and purports to constrain the discretion
of judges by limiting them to the autonomous legal text.' The
1. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 171 (1996)
("Members of the judiciary remain uncertain or publicly undecided about some deep
underlying questions about the interpretation of statutes, and they attempt, to the extent
they can, to decide questions of statutory meaning without answering those questions.");
Michael C. Dorf,Foreword: The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112HARV.L. REV. 4,5 (1998)
(commenting on the 1997 Supreme Court Term: "[The principal disagreements concerned
how to read statutes. How dispositive is statutory text? Should the Court attempt to discern
the intent of the Congress that enacted a statute, and ifso, using what tools? Is the meaning
of a statute fixed at its adoption or does it evolve?"); Daniel Farber, The Scholarly Attorney
as Lawyerly Judge: Stevens on Statutes, 1992/1993 ANN. SURV. A. L. xxxv, xxxvii ("In the
past decade, a debate has raged about the proper methods of statutory interpretation.").
The protracted and intense debate about interpretive methodology has been the subject
of significant scholarly commentary. For examples of this scholarship, see the sources cited
in WILUAmN. ESKEIDGE, JR., & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION:
STATUTES AND THE CREATION OFPUBLIC POLICY 751 n.3 (2d ed. 1995), as well as the articles
and commentary presented in the symposium on Formalism and Statutory Interpretation,
66 U. CM. L. REV. 635 (1999).
2. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Must Formalism Be Defended Empirically?, 66 U.
Cm. L. REv. 636 (1999). Professor Sunstein's article is the leading article in the Formalism
and Statutory Interpretation portion of a symposium entitled Formalism Revisited. See
Symposium, Formalism Revisited, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 527 (1999).
3. Professor Sunstein described these purposes of formalist interpretations:
[Flormalism is an attempt to make the law both autonomous, in the particular
sense that it does not depend on moral or political values of particular judges,
and also deductive, in the sense that judges decide cases mechanically on the
basis of preexisting law and do not exercise discretion in individual cases.
Formalism therefore entails an interpretive method that relies on the text of
the relevant law and that excludes or minimizes extratextual sources of law. It
tends as well to favor judicial holdings that take the form of wide rules rather
than narrow settlements of particular disputes.
Sunstein, supra note 2, at 638-39; see also MichaelP. Healy, Legislative Intent and Statutory
Interpretation in England and the United States: An Assessment of the Impact of Pepper v.
Hart, 35 STAN. J. INT'LL. 231, 232-33 (1999) (discussing the textualist approach). Professor
Sunstein has written that:
Because formalism downplays the role of extratextual sources, it generally
denies courts four relevant powers: to make exceptions to the text when those
exceptions seem sensible or even necessary, to allow meaning to change over
time; to invoke "canons" of construction to push statutes in favored directions;
and to invoke the purposes of the legislature to press otherwise unambiguous
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second is the nonformalist or antiformalist method, which may
consider the legislature's intent or purpose or other evidence as
context for understanding the statutory text.4 The debate within the
current Court is commonly framed and advanced by Justices
Stevens and Scalia. Justice Scalia is now famous for his rigid
adherence to formalism.' Justice Stevens rejects the formalist
method, grounded as it is solely on the abstract meaning of
statutory text, and employs instead the contextual, nonformalist
method that seeks to interpret statutes by reference to the
legislature's intent and purpose.6 This debate about methodology is
important because different interpretive results may well follow
from the interpretive method that is employed.'
words in certain directions.
Sunstein, supra note 2, at 639.
4. As Professor Sunstein explains:
There is certainly no canonical form of antiformalism, and those who reject
formalism can offermany different competing approaches. Butthe antiformalist
tends to insist that interpretation requires or permits resort to sources other
than the text, and the antiformalist tends as well to support judgments that
take the form of narrow rather than wide holdings.
Id. (footnote omitted). Nonformalists are often divided into several categories, including
intentionalists and purposivists, depending on their contextual rationale. See Healy, supra
note 3, at 233-36. Professor Sunstein has written that this broad antiformalist category
includes a range of interpretive approaches:
No antiformalist thinks that judges interpreting statutes should engage in ad
hoc balancing of all relevant considerations. The real division is along a
continuum. One pole is represented by those who aspire to textually driven,
rule-bound, rule-announcing judgments; the other is represented by those who
are quite willing to reject the text when it would produce an unreasonable
outcome, or when it is inconsistent with the legislative history, or when it
conflicts with policy judgments of certain kinds or substantive canons of
construction.
Sunstein, supra note 2, at 640.
5. See infra note 39.
6. See infra note 43.
7. For example, the Court's decision in Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S.
457 (1892), is famous because the Court rejected the text-based, formalist approach, which
had led to the imposition of a statutory penalty for violating the statutory prohibition, see
United States v. Church of the Holy Trinity, 36 F. 303,303-04 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1888), rev'd, 143
U.S. 457 (1892), and instead found that there had been no statutory violation based on a
nonformalist method that considered the statute's purpose and legislative history. Holy
Trinity, 143 U.S. at 462-63. See generally Carol Chomsky, Unlocking the Mysteries of Holy
Trinity: Spirit, Letter, and History in Statutory Interpretation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 901 (2000)
(arguing the appropriateness of relying on legislative history to construe statutes properly);
Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits of Judicial Competence: The Untold
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This Article provides a context for assessing the Court's debate
about interpretive methodology through an examination of the past
and contemporary place of the communis opinio canon in cases of
statutory construction. The Article begins by describing Brogan v.
United States,8 a recent case in which Justices Scalia and Stevens
debated the modern relevance of the ancient canon of communis
opinio.9 The Court, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, employed the
formalist method to reject a narrow interpretation of a broad
criminal prohibition on making false statements to federal
officials.10 Justice Stevens, invoking the communis opinio canon in
his nonformalist dissent, relied on a long-standing practice that had
developed under the statute, and was accepted by the Department
of Justice and several courts, to impose substantial limits on the
scope of the criminal prohibition." Justice Scalia derided this resort
to the communis opinio canon, contending first, that the canon
simply did not apply to the interpretation of a statutory text and
second, that the canon resulted in an error being adopted as law
because of its wide acceptance.1 2
The second part of the Article considers the validity of Justice
Scalia's claim that the communis opinio canon has no proper
application to the interpretation of statutes. The Article addresses
the source of the communis opinio canon and a closely related canon
in Coke's Institutes, hypothesizes reasons for the articulation of the
canons by Chancellor Coke, and considers the easy acceptance and
Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1833 (1998) (arguing for a new rule that
avoids judicial reliance on legislative history). Similarly, in two communis opinio decisions,
United States v. Hill, 120 U.S. 169 (1887) (discussedinfra atnotes 103-10 and accompanying
text) and MKeen v. Delancy's Lessee, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 22 (1809), the Courts nonformalist
interpretive method led to decisions that were inconsistent with the clear and determinate
meaning of the text, Another fine example of how the two interpretive methods yield
contrary interpretive results is the English decision in Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v. Hart,
1 All E.R. 42 (H.L. 1993). There, the House of Lords employed a formalist approach and
reached one interpretive result. See id. at 52, 54. After being advised about legislative history
contrary to the formalist meaning of the text, the House of Lords reached the contrary
interpretive result when it reheard the case and employed a nonformalist interpretive
method. See id. at 71. See generally Healy, supra note 3.
8. 522 U.S. 398 (1998).
9. See infra Part I.
10. Brogan, 522 U.S. at 399-408.
11. See infra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
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application of the hybridized canon in early American cases.'" This
section will show how the canon, whose value was ridiculed by
Justice Scalia, was commonly accepted by American courts. The
Article then considers the conventional requirements for the
application of the canon and examines how effectively those
requirements have constrained the use of the canon in statutory
interpretation. 4 Finally, this part of the Article considers the
varying interpretive effects that courts have given to the canon
when it is applicable. 5 One of these interpretive effects, employed
in two notable cases, one decided by Chief Justice Marshall"8 and
the other'7 decided five years before the Court famously "endorsed
countertextual interpretive techniques" 8 in Holy Trinity Church v.
United States,9 has been to reject the clear, determinate meaning
of the statutory text and to accept instead the common practice that
developed under the statute." In short, far from being inapplicable
to the interpretation of statutes, the communis opinio canon has
been employed by the Supreme Court to reach countertextual
interpretive results.
Given that the communis opinio canon has been used by the
Supreme Court to present interpretations that conflict with the
apparent meaning of the text, the last part of this Article considers
whether a court acts properly when it accords legal significance,
including a determinative effect, to communis opinio.2' Particular
attention is given to Justice Scalia's claim that communis opinio
13. See infra Part II.A.
14. See infra Part H.B.
15. See infra Part II.C.
16. M'Keen v. Delancy's Lessee, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 22 (1809).
17. United States v. Hill, 120 U.S. 169 (1887).
18. Vermeule, supra note 7, at 1836.
19. 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
20. See infra Part H.C.3.
21. In discussingthe interpretive significance ofcommunis opinio, this Article is focused
on vertical legal coherence, except to the extent that the common practice that develops
under a statute reflects the community's evolved understanding of the law. See ESKRIDGE &
FRICKEY, supra note 1, at 423-24 (contrasting vertical coherence and horizontal coherence
in law). The Article does not purport to address in detail whether there are circumstances
under which the horizontal coherence of law ought to compel interpretations of statutes that
conflict with statutory text or common practice. Cf infra notes 192-93 (discussing
circumstances under which modem notions of justice should trump inconsistent common
practice).
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yields interpretations that have the effect of changing the law by
codifying common error. This analysis initially proceeds by
considering the three rationales traditionally employed for
employing the communis opinio canon-strong evidence of the
meaning of text,' evidence of the intent of the drafters of the text,'
and public reliance.2' When it fails to account for communis opinio,
a formalist court loses a valuable opportunity to place a reliable
check on the autonomy of that interpretive method and undermines
important reliance interests.
The Article then presents a fourth rationale for the strong use of
the canon: its use reflects a proper role of the court in the process
of lawmaking. The Article first assumes the significance of the rule-
of-law values that formalism purports to serve. Because common
practice constitutes law in important ways, the communis opinio
canon should provide an especially important context for inter-
preting statutes under the formalist or antiformalist methods.
Ignoring communis opinio may yield interpretations that are
inconsistent with the rule-of-law values that formalism tries to
promote.' The presumptive meaning that this canon should give to
statutory text has strong indicia of correctness and ought to be
rejected only when other textual and contextual meanings are
uniform and contrary.
One historically important context in which the formalist
Justices have recognized the status of practice as law was the
recent presidential election cases. In deciding whether the Florida
Supreme Court had changed state election law when it interpreted
the election statute, the three concurring Justices in Bush v. Gore,26
including Justices Scalia and Thomas, relied on two standards
against which to gauge whether the decision had effected a change
in law: variance from the text27 and, importantly, variance from
prior practice. 28 To be sure, the concurring opinion makes no
reference to the canon of communis opinio in relying on prior
22. See infra Part I.A.
23. See infra Part lI.B.
24. See infra Part IH.C.
25. See infra Part IH.D.1.
26. 531 U.S. 98, 111-12 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
27. See id. at 112-22.
28. See id.
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practice to discern a change in law. The opinion does, however,
properly accept the significance of practice in fixing the content of
law.29 This section concludes that Justice Scalia's formalist aversion
to communis opinio strongly undercuts the formalist method's
traditional claims to legitimacy and may encourage judicial
interpretations that have the effect of changing law.
The Article's final section discusses how the formalist aversion to
employing the communis opinio canon yields erroneous decisions
and undercuts the empirical value of the formalist method by
increasing the costs of the legal system."0
I. A MODERN DEBATE ABOUT AN ANCIENT CANON: BROGAN V.
UNITED STATES AND COMMUNIS OPINIO
In Brogan v. United States,3' the Supreme Court decided whether
a "mere denial of wrongdoing" 2 was a violation of the federal
prohibition against making false statements to federal officials.3
That statutory prohibition was written in the following broad
terms:
29. Whether the practice relied upon by the concurring Justices to identify a change in
law was sufficient to meet the traditional requirements for the application of the communis
opinio canon is doubtful. Those requirements are discussed in part H.B. A recent book
addressing the disputed 2000 election stated that
there was simply no state law or administrative practice of significance that
bore on the question of how Florida applied these disputed-election statutes to
a statewide election contest. In addition, there was no evidence from the text
of these state laws that, when they were designed, any legislator had a
Presidential election contest in mind one way or the other.
SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., WHEN ELECTIONS GO BAD: THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY AND THE
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 2000, at 19 (2001). These authors also stated:
Because there had been no statewide election contests previously, let alone a
Presidential one, neither side could point to clearly established state practices
or rulings in similar situation (with the exception of one issue, the standard for
what counted as a legal vote in a manual recount process, on which there was
arguably prior evidence from one county, though not a prior statewide
standard).
Id. at 20.
30. See infra Part III.D.2.
31. 522 U.S. 398 (1998).
32. Id. at 399.
33. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000)).
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Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any
department or agency of the United States knowingly and
willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick, scheme, or
device a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or
fraudulent statements or representations, or makes or uses any
false writing or document knowing the same to contain any
false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined
not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years,
or both. 4
Notwithstanding the breadth of this statutory text, a practice had
developed over many years that an "exculpatory no"-that is a
simple denial of wrongdoing-did not come within the criminal
prohibition. This practice consisted of a long line of decisions by the
courts of appeals accepting an "exculpatory no" defense to claimed
violations of the criminal prohibition,3 5 a Department of Justice
policy against prosecutions for statements that are mere denials of
wrongdoing,"6 and a confession of error by the Solicitor General
before the Supreme Court that was approved by the Court.37
Writing for six members of the Court,"8 Justice Scalia employed
his usual formalist method for interpreting a statute 9 and
determined that "the plain language of § 1001 admits of no ex-
ception for an 'exculpatory no."' ° For Justice Scalia, the breadth of
the statute's text foreclosed any possibility of a narrow judicial
construction: "[lit is not, and cannot be, our practice to restrict the
34. Id.
35. See Brogan, 522 U.S. at 401 (citing cases).
36. Id at415 (Stevens, J.,dissenting) (quotingthe Department ofJustice's United States
Attorneys' Manual).
37. Id. at 414-15 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (discussing confession of error and Court
action in Nunley v. United States, 434 U.S. 962 (1977)).
38. Justice Scalia's decision was joined fully by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy, andThomas. Justice Souter, the sixth Justice,joined the Court's opinion
except for the Court's response to concerns about prosecutorial abuse in the application of
the prohibition against false statements. Id. at 408 (Souter, J., concurring).
39. See Farber, supra note 1, at xxxvii ("On the Supreme Court, Justice Scalia has
emerged as the champion of textualism."); Michael P. Healy, The Attraction and Limits of
Textualism. The Supreme Court Decision in PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington
Department of Ecology, 5 N.Y.U. ENvTL. L.J. 382, 433 n.210 (1996) (discussing Justice
Scalia's approach toward textualism); Sunstein, supra note 2, at 639 ("[O]n the current
Supreme Court, Justice Scalia is [formalism's] most enthusiastic proponent.") (footnote
omitted).
40. Brogan, 522 U.S. at 408.
2001] 547
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:539
unqualified language of a statute to the particular evil that
Congress was trying to remedy-even assuming that it is possible
to identify that evil from something other than the text of the
statute itself."4
Justice Stevens dissented.42 Employing his usual eclectic, non-
formalist approach to statutory interpretation,4 Justice Stevens
concluded that Congress intended to proscribe a narrower range of
conduct than the statutory text indicated, and that the "exculpatory
no" exception should be recognized by the Court." In defending this
conclusion, Justice Stevens relied on the ancient canon ofcommunis
opinio to establish that, because a narrow understanding of the
scope of the statutory prohibition was well and long accepted by the
legal community, the statute should be interpreted narrowly by the
Court.' Justice Stevens contended that "the Court should show
41. Id. at 403.
42. Justice Stevens was joined by Justice Breyer. Id. at 418 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
43. See Farber, supra note 1, at xxxvii ("Justice Stevens has rgued vigorously against
the new textualism, pointing out time and again that a wooden readingofstatutorylanguage
serves only to muddle public policy and obstruct Congressional goals.*) (footnote omitted);
id. at xliii (The current leading scholars in statutory interpretation identify Justice Stevens
an exemplar of practical reason in statutory interpretation.*) (footnote omitted); see also
William D. Popkin, A Common Law Lawyer on the Supreme Court: The Opinions of Justice
Stevens, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1087, 1149 (1989) ("A preference for legislative intent over plain
meaning is often noted by Justice Stevens."). Professor Sunstein describes Justice Breyer,
who joined Justice Stevens's dissent in Brogan, as "an outspoken critic of formalism."
Sunstein, supra note 2, at 640.
44. Brogan, 522 U.S. at 419-20 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
45. Justice Stevens has argued for the application of the communis opinio canon in
decisions otherthanBrogan. Id at 420 (Stevens,J., dissenting) (citing cases). Justice Seala's
opinion in Brogan chides Justice Stevens for his unwillingness to apply the canon on a
consistent basis, contending that the canon 'becomes yet another user-friendly judicial rule
to be invoked ad libitum." Id. at 408. Communis opinio would, however, hardly be the first
canon, or even principle of statutory construction, to be relied upon inconsistently by an
interpreter of statutory text. See generally Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of
Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3
VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950) (describing thrust-and-parry characteristics of opposing canons of
construction). In fact, Justice Stevens leveled a similar charge in PUD No. 1 of Jefferson
County v. Washington Dept of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 723 (1994) (Stevens, J., concurring),
chiding Justices Scalia and Thomas, who dissented in the case, for being inconsistent by
failing to apply and accept the consequences of their formalist method:
For judges who find it unnecessary to go behind the statutory text to discern
the intent of Congress, this is (or should be) an easy case. Not a single
sentence, phrase, or word in the Clean Water Act purports to place any
constraint on a State's power to regulate the quality of its own waters more
stringently than federal law might require. In fact, the Act explicitly recognizes
548
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greater respect for the virtually uniform understanding of the bench
and the bar that persisted for decades with ... the approval of this
Court as well as the Department of Justice."46 Justice Stevens
indicated that such respect was proper and warranted because "as
Sir Edward Coke phrased it, 'it is the common opinion, and
communis opinio is of good authoritie in law."'
Justice Stevens's reliance on Coke received a two-part response
from Justice Scalia. First, Justice Scalia stated that Justice Stevens
had "wrenched [the principle] out of its context""s by applying a
principle that Chancellor Coke had applied to the common law, or
"lex communis," to the interpretation of a statute.'9 Second, Justice
Scalia suggested that the principle is unsound because, "[wihile
communis error facitjus [common error makes law] may be a sadly
accurate description of reality, it is not the normative basis of this
Court's jurisprudence. Courts may not create their own limitations
onlegislation,... no matter how widely the blame may be spread."0
In sum, the Court's decision in Brogan showed the contrasting
reactions of formalist and nonformalist interpretive methods to the
communis opinio canon. This Article now turns to a consideration
of Justice Scalia's two-part attack on the canon: that it has no
applicability to the interpretation of statutes, and that it is, in any
event, a fundamentally flawed basis for understanding the meaning
of a statutory text.
States' ability to impose stricter standards.
46. Brogan, 522 U.S. at 420 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 420-21 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote and citation omitted).
48. Id. at 407.
49. Id. at 407 n.3. Justice Scalia stated further that: "As applied to [lex communis], of
course, the statement is not only true but almost an iteration; it amounts to saying that the
common law is the common law." I&
50. Id. at 408. Justice Stevens gave this response to Justice Scalia's invocation of the
communis error precept:
The majority's invocation of the maxim communis error facit jus adds little
weight to their argument. As Lord Ellenborough stated in Isherwood v.
Oldknow, 3 Maule & Selwyn 382,396-97 (K. B. 1815):
"It has been sometimes said, communis error facit jus; but I say communis
opinio is evidence of what the law is; not where it is an opinion merely
speculative and theoretical floating in the minds of persons, but where it has
been made the ground-work and substratum of practice."
Id. at 421 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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II. THE SOURCE AND APPLICATION OF THE COMMUNIS OPINIO
CANON
A. Coke's Articulation of the Principle and Early Applications
In the first part of Institutes, Sir Edward Coke discusses the
content of the English common law and presents this material in
the form of a commentary upon the previous work of Littleton. 1 On
two occasions in Institutes, when describing the law of joint
tenancy52 and the law of warranty,"3 Chancellor Coke states the
principle ofcommunis opinio in defining the content of the common
law. As Justice Scalia argued in his opinion in Brogan,54 Chancellor
Coke's high regard for common opinion is understandable in the
context of defining the common law. Indeed, William Blackstone, in
describing the common law or leges non scripta, stated that "their
original institution and authority were not set down in writing, as
acts of parliament are, but they receive their binding power and the
force of laws by long and immemorial usage, and by their universal
reception through the kingdom."' Moreover, there is the sense that
the doctrine of communis opinio would have appealed to the
conservatism of Chancellor Coke, who, on occasion in his Institutes,
51. DAvID M. WALKER, THE OXFORD COMPANION TO LAW 625 (1980).
52. See 1 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES § 288, at 186 (Garland Publishing 1979) (1628)
(footnotes omitted), where he wrote:
Also, it is commonly said, that everyjointenant is seised of the land which he
holdeth jointly per my et per tout; and this is as much to say as he is seised by
every parcel and by the whole, etc., and this is true, for in every parcell, and by
every parcell [sic] and by all the lands and tenements he is joyntly seised with
his companion.
That is, it is the common opinion, and communis opinio is of good authority
in law. A communi observantia non est recedendum, which appeareth here by
Littleton.
53. See id. § 697, at 364-65, where he wrote:
II est communement dit. ["It is commonly said."] Here by the opinion of
Littleton, communis opinio is of authority, and stands with the rule of law, A
communi observantia not est recedendum: and again, Minime mutanda sunt
quae certam habuerunt interpretationem.
54. Brogan, 522 U.S. at 407 & n.3.
55. 1 WnAm BLACKSTONE, COmmNTARIES *111. Interestingly, Justice Scalia has
disputed the role of common practice in defining common law. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A
MATITER OF INTERPRETATION 4 (1997) ("Mhe common law is not really common law, except
insofar as judges can be regarded as common. That is to say, it is not 'customary law,' or a
reflection of the people's practices, but is rather law developed by the judges.").
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extols the virtues of attention to accepted practices or customs for
those entering the practice of law.56
Justice Scalia's attempt to demean the application of communis
opinio by maintaining that the maxim is applicable in determining
the content of the common law, but not the meaning of statutes,
would thus appear to derive support from the first part of Institutes.
Chancellor Coke did not recognize such a limitation himself,
however, as his writings in the second part of Institutes make clear.
The second part of Institutes considers the written, rather than the
common, law, including the Magna Carta. There, in the context of
commenting on the meaning of written law, Coke states the rule
that "Contemporanea expositio est fortissima in lege,"7 that is,
contemporary exposition is the strongest in the law. Coke applies
this canon to demonstrate the "true intendment of these words,"
notwithstanding that "[slome have thought that these words are to
be understood" to have a different meaning.'
Justice Stevens's tracing of the communis opinio maxim in
interpreting statutes back to Chancellor Coke is accordingly
reasonable because Coke himself identified and employed the
analogous contemporanea expositio canon to interpret written law.
9
The label may be somewhat misleading when applied to statutes,
but the principle fits. Moreover, the whole understanding of English
56. For an example of this advice, see 1 COKE, supra note 52, § 371, at 229, where he
wrote that "hiere it appeareth that which is most commonly used in conveyances is the
surest way. A communi observantia non est recedendum, & minime mutanda sunt quae
certan habuerunt interpretationem. Magisterrerum usus." He included similar advice in the
next section of Institutes:
Here Littleton sets down three formes of deeds indented in the first person,
brevis viaperexempla, longaperprecepta. Itis requisite for every student to get
precedents and approved formes not only of deeds according to the example of
Littleton, but of fines, and other conveyances, and assurances, and especially
ofgood andperfectpleading, and ofthe right entries, andformes ofjudgements,
which will stand him in great stead: both while he studies, and after when he
shall give counsel. It is a safe thing to follow approved precedents, for nihil
simul inventum estperfectum.
Id § 372, at 23O.
57. 2 EDWARD COKE, INSTTrUTES 10 (London, E. & R. Brooke 1797).
58. Id.
59. One of the cases that Justice Stevens relied upon in support ofcommunis opinio in
Brogan was United States v. The Reindeer, 27 F. Cas. 758 (C.C.D.R.I. 1861) (No. 16,145).
Brogan, 522 U.S. at 421 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Reindeer relied on the contemporanea
expositio form of the canon. The Reindeer, 27 F. Cas. at 761-62.
20011 551
552 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:539
common lawyers was grounded in history and "there were special
incentives for an English lawyer to consider the law in an historical
fashion." Thus, the public understanding of written law would
have appeared to a lawyer such as Coke as a proper basis upon
which to fix legal meaning. The canon of construction is also
conservative in its acceptance of the received meaning of statutes
and thus conforms to the essential conservatism of the English legal
system.
6 1
A final reason why Scalia fails in his effort to fault Stevens for
relying on the communis opinio maxim as a canon of statutory
construction can be found in Chancellor Coke's general attitude
toward statutes. Statutes were understood by Coke,62 and later by
60. DAVID LIEBERMAN, THE PROvINcE OF LEGISLATION DETERINED: LEGAL THEORY IN
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN 41 (1989) (footnote omitted). Professor Lieberman has
written:
Just as English lawyers interpreted their civil liberties as an ancient body of
historic rights, so their attitude to constitutional norms and political authority
turned on their reading of the past. Hence, there were special incentives for an
English lawyer to consider the law in an historical fashion, and Blackstone
responded fully to them, recognizing both the legal and political importance of
treating English law as an historical entity.
Id.
61. The conservative character of the English system is captured by the following
anecdote:
The discretionary powers of the equity judge seemed contrary to the objectives
and character of English law from another standpoint. This was in terms of the
more general concern to preserve legal "certainty" against possible judicial
disruption. As Bacon claimed, "[clertainty is so essential to law that law cannot
even be just without it... It is well said also, 'That that is the best law which
leaves least to the discretion of the judge'; and this comes from the certainty of
it." Increasingly in the eighteenth century, this position was taken up by
utilitarian moralists to develop an understanding of precedent close to the
modem doctrine of stare decisis.
Id at 79 (footnote omitted). Indeed, these conservative characteristics are closely associated
with the formalist interpretive method. See infra notes 267-71 and accompanying text.
62. See Max Radin,A Short Way with Statutes, 56 HARV. L. REV. 388,389-90 (1942), who
describes this attitude toward statutes as follows:
The statute issues from a sovereign who in feudal times was conceived of not
as a depositary of supreme power, but as the capstan of the feudal edifice,
whose duty to maintain ancient and reasonable customs was as definite a part
of his complex of functions as his diverse and miscellaneous powers of
privileges, his regalia, which were later fused with the concept of the
prerogative. ...
The oath the feudal king took was to maintain the ancient customs of the
realm, and to Coke the ancient customs were identical with the common law.
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Blackstone," as intrusions on the common law. As one of the
pioneers in seeking to define the rules for construing statutes,"
63. See LIEBERMAN, supra note 60, at 71 ( PMhe practice of the courts both reflected and
lent crucial support to those who construed the relationship in such a way so as to restrict
the scope of parliameutary action. Thus the emphasis remains the Blackstonean one of
placing the claims of common law somehow against the statute book."); i at 72 ("In the long
view of English legal history, the manner by which common law controlled legislation was
to render it superfluous. The remarkable durability and adaptability of the common law
system was what securedits primacywithin the legal system."). Seegenerally Harry Wililmer
Jones, Statutory Doubts and Legislative Intention, 40 COLUM L. REV. 957, 958 (1940).
Professor Jones made the following comments about traditional English attitudes toward
statutes:
[Tihe evolution of the statute law to a position, at least, of parity with the
judge-made law demands the reexamination of judicial methods developed
during periods in which the chief concern of the judges was to build up an
interpretative technique by which occasional, ad hoc legislative directions
might be fitted, neatly and without disturbance, into the general fabric of
common law. The general judicial attitude at the time of the original
pronouncement of the traditional rules of statutory interpretation is indicated
by the charge of a great common lawyer, the late Sir Frederick Pollock, that
many of those rules-of-thumb known as canon of construction 0... cannot well
be accounted for except upon the theory that Parliament generally changes the
law for the worse, and that the business of the judge is to keep the mischief of
its interference within the narrowest possible bounds.'
Id. (quOtingFREDERICKPOLLOCK, ESSAYSINJURISPUDENCEANDETHICS 85 (1882)) (footnote
omitted).
64. Chancellor Coke has been recognized as one of the first important Anglo-American
lawyers to seek to identify rules for construing statutes. See A. Arthur Schiller, Roman
Interpretatio and Anglo-American Interpretation and Construction, 27 VA. L. REV. 733, 764
(1941). Professor Schiller wrote:
Canons or rules ofconstruction play an infinitely largerpart inAnglo-American
interpretation than in modern European law. The standard treatises on
interpretation of statutes use these canons to group the cases that have dealt
with the subject, and the extensive studies dealing with the construction of the
various types of private instruments present much of the same picture. If the
Anglo-American law has any theoretical side to interpretation it is to be found
in the series of canons of construction for statutes, wills, contracts and the like.
Yet in its beginnings English law paid little attention to this aspect of
interpretation, for each case was decided on its own merits. With Plowden and
Coke, however, the development of canons is well under way, reaching its
height some centuries later in works such as Rutherforth and Dwarris. Kent
and Story, likewise, emphasize canons as a basis of discussion and Lieber's
general and special rules of interpretation had some effect on 19th century
American jurisprudence. In the latter half of that century voices were raised
against the excessive importance given rules of construction, and hardly a
writer today does not deplore the blind adherence to "barbaric rules of
interpretation."
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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Chancellor Coke naturally embraced a rule requiring a narrow
interpretation of a statute in a case in which the affected public
accepted and understood that the statute displaced the commonlaw
to only a limited degree. Indeed, for a jurist who is recognized for
having articulated the doctrine that courts may find acts of
parliament void when contrary to reason,6" the principle that
statutes should be interpreted according to how they are understood
to fit within the customs of the people seems a principle of judicial
restraint. In sum, the communis opinio maxim is one that had a
natural appeal to the English common law tradition, both in the
context of defining the common law and in determining the
meaning of statutes.
It should not be surprising, then, that the maxim was readily
accepted as a doctrine of American law in the first years of
the Supreme Court. The initial application of the doctrine by
the Supreme Court occurred in a case that challenged the
constitutionality of the practice of employing Supreme Court
Justices as circuit judges.6 In a unanimous opinion by Justice
Paterson, affirming the judgment of Chief Justice Marshall, who
had sat below as a circuit judge, the Court rejected the claim of
unconstitutionality by relying on the common understanding of
Article I of the Constitution:
Another reason for reversal is, that the judges of the Supreme
Court have no right to sit as circuit judges, not being appointed
as such, or in other words, that they ought to have distinct
commissions for that purpose. To this objection, which is of
recent date, it is sufficient to observe, that practice and
acquiescence under it for a period of several years, commencing
65. As Professor Lieberman wrote:
The doctrine [that acts of Parliament "contrary to reason" were void in
themselves] received its most famous airing in Coke's decision in Bonham's
case, where the oracle of law declared that "in many cases the common law will
control acts of parliament... sometimes it will judge them completely void." It
remains unclearpreciselywhat Coke intended by this, particularlywith regard
to the extent of the judiciary's power. But despite these difficulties, it was
possible to take the statement at face value. In a case of 1710, Chief Justice
Holt described Coke's claim in Bonham's case as "a very reasonable and true
saying," and then utilized it to counter a statute.
LIEBERMAN, supra note 60, at 53 (footnotes omitted).
66. Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803).
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with the organization of the judicial system, afford an
irresistible answer, and has indeed fixed the construction. It is
a contemporary interpretation of the most forcible nature. This
practical exposition is too strong and obstinate to be shaken or
controlled. Of course, the question is at rest, and ought not now
to be disturbed.67
The Court was accordingly quite comfortable "fix[ing] the
construction" of the written Constitution on the basis of "practice
and acquiescence under it for a period of several years."'
Chief Justice Marshall did not have to wait many years to employ
the doctrine himself, this time to give a meaning to statutory text
that had a different literal meaning. InMKeen v. Delaney's Lessee,69
the Court had to determine whether a deed had been properly
recorded. The state statute at issue there provided that, before a
deed could be recorded, the deed had to be acknowledged or proved
"'before one of the justices of the peace of the proper county or city
where the lands lie.'"70 The deed that was the subject of the dispute
before the Court had been "acknowledged before John Lawrence,
one of the justices of the supreme court of Pennsylvania; and
was recorded in the office for the city and county of Philadelphia,
in which a part of the lands lie."7 The Court summarized the
following evidence of the common practice regarding recording in
Pennsylvania:
[Tihe courts of Pennsylvania consider a justice of the supreme
court as within the description of the act.
... [Tihis deed was acknowledged by the chief justice, who
certainly must have been acquainted with the construction
given to the act, and ... the acknowledgment was taken before
another judge of the supreme court. Itis also recollected that the
gentlemen of the bar, who supported the conveyance, spoke
positively as to the universal understanding of the state, on this
point, and that those who controverted the usage on other
points, did not controvert it on this. But what is decisive with
67. Id. at 309.
68. Id.
69. 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 22 (1809).
70. Id. at 32 (quoting the Pennsylvania Act of May 28, 1715).
71. Id.
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the court is, that the judge who presides in the circuit court for
the district of Pennsylvania, reports to us that this construction
was universally received. 2
In deciding that the deed had been properly recorded and proved,
Chief Justice Marshall wrote:
Were this act of 1715 now, for the first time, to be construed, the
opinion of this court would certainly be, that the deed was not
regularly proved. A justice of the supreme court would not be
deemed a justice of the county, and the decision would be, that
the deed was not properly proved, and therefore not legally
recorded.
But, in construing the statutes of a state on which land titles
depend, infinite mischief would ensue, should this court observe
a different rule from that which has been long established in the
state; and in this case, the court cannot doubt that the courts of
Pennsylvania consider a justice of the supreme court as within
the description of the act.7
Although Justice Scalia would no doubt view the case as an
example of communis error facit jus, Chief Justice Marshall felt
constrained to give the statute its commonly accepted meaning
despite the written text.
About twenty years later, Justice Story, one of America's greatest
nineteenth-century legal thinkers, had occasion to consider the
application of Coke's maxim. In United States v. Bank of North
Carolina,74 the Court had to decide how to construe statutory text
that fixed the priority of the United States to the assets of a debtor.
In urging his construction of the language, Attorney General Roger
Taney relied upon the communis opinio doctrine.7' Justice Story
72. Id. at 32-33.
73. Id. at 32.
74. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 29 (1832).
75. Taney argued:
The construction of the law of the United States now claimed, has been that of
universal practice since it was enacted. From 1797 down to the present period,
it has been applied in favor of the United States to bonds not due, as well as to
others to become due; and the estates of insolvents and intestates have been
adjusted and settled on this principle, in every section of the Union. This
received construction will induce the court to hesitate before it will adopt
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resolved the matter in favor of the United States, relying in part on
the communis opinio doctrine:
It is not unimportant, to state, that the construction, which we
have given to the terms of the act, is that which is understood to
have been practically acted upon by the government, as well as
by individuals, ever since its enactment. Many estates, as well
of deceased persons, as of persons insolvent, who have made
general assignments, have been settled upon the footing of its
correctness. A practice so long and so general would, of itself,
furnish strong grounds for a liberal construction; and could not
now be disturbed, without introducing a train of serious
mischiefs. We think, the practice was founded in the true
exposition of the terms and intent of the act; but if it were
susceptible of some doubt, so long an acquiescence in it, would
justify us in yielding to it as a safe and reasonable exposition."6
Indeed, by the early twentieth century, the Supreme Court was
comfortable in declaring that "[niothing is more convincing in
interpretation of a doubtful or ambiguous statute" than "the
uniform practice of [an executive agency] for nearly thirty years." 7
In sum, notwithstanding Justice Scalia's suggestion that there is no
basis for applying the communis opinio canon to the construction of
statutes, just such a use of the principle was articulated by
Chancellor Coke, fits comfortably within the English common
another, as it would open those long-established settlements, and would be
productive of great difficulty and confusion.
Id. at 31.
76. Id. at 3940. The communis opinio maxim was employed by federal courts in other
cases prior to 1850. For example, in United States v. Macdaniel, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 1 (1833), the
Court stated that "[u sage cannot alter the law, but it is evidence of the construction given
to it; and must be considered binding on past transactions." Id. at 15. The Court then held
that [flor more than fifteen years, the claim has been paid for similar services, and it is now
too late to withhold it for services actually rendered." Id. at 16; see also United States v. The
Reindeer, 27 F. Cas. 758 (C.C.D.R.I. 1861) (No. 16,145) (cited by Justice Stevens in his
dissenting opinion in Brogan v. United States, 422 U.S. 398,421 n.4 (1998)).
77. Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367, 413 (1929) ("This construction of Section 10 is
sustained by the uniform practice of the War Department for nearly thirty years. Nothing
is more convincing in interpretation of a doubtful or ambiguous statute.") (citations omitted);
see also Briscoe v. Buzbee, 143 So. 887, 887 (Miss. 1932) ("Contemporary construction as a
rule of construing statutes is as old as the common law, and has, throughout the history of
the state, been recognized as the proper course in doubtful cases.") (citations omitted).
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lawyers' suspicion of statute law, and was immediately embraced
by eminent jurists in the newly independent United States.
B. Traditional Application of the Canon in Statutory Cases
The foregoing survey of the historical roots of the communis
opinio canon sets the stage for the following description of how
the canon has traditionally been applied in statutory cases. As will
be seen, courts established two requirements for the application
of the canon: an ambiguous statute and a showing of well-settled
contemporary usage, which could be defined by either common
practice or common inaction. The last part of this section will
discuss the effect that courts have given to the canon when it has
been used in interpreting a statute.
1. Statutory Ambiguity
The first long-standing requirement for the application of the
communis opinio canon is that the meaning of the statute be
ambiguous. There are numerous examples of this textual-ambiguity
requirement in the application of the communis opinio canon. For
example, in McPherson v. Blacker,7 the Supreme Court held that
the canon had no applicability when the text of the constitutional
provision at issue was unambiguous:
The framers of the Constitution employed words in their natural
sense; and where they are plain and clear, resort to collateral
aids to interpretation is unnecessary and cannot be indulged
in to narrow or enlarge the text; but where there is ambiguity
or doubt, or where two views may well be entertained,
contemporaneous and subsequent practical construction are
entitled to the greatest weight.79
Because the text of the Constitution addressing the method by
which presidential electors are selected by the states was
ambiguous, common understanding and practice determined the
78. 146 U.S. 1 (1892).
79. Id. at 27.
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meaning of the text.80 Similarly, the Court has rejected the
application of communis opinio in the face of a clear text.81
That an ambiguous text was seen as necessary before a court
could properly employ the canon is understandable in view of
the traditional English source of the canon. 2 Given Justice
80. The Court stated:
[Pilaintiffs in error cannot reasonably assert that the clause of the Constitution
under consideration so plainly sustains their position as to entitle them to
object that contemporaneous history and practical construction are not to be
allowed their legitimate force, and, conceding that their argument inspires a
doubt sufficient to justify resort to the aids of interpretation thus afforded, we
are of opinion that such doubt is thereby resolved against them, the
contemporaneous practical exposition of the Constitution being too strong and
obstinate to be shaken or controlled.
Id (citation omitted).
81. See United States v. Graham, 110 U.S. 219,221 (1884), in which the Court stated:
[Itmatters not what the practice of the departmen smay (sic] have been orhow
long continued, for it can only be resorted to in aid of interpretation, and "it is
not allowable to interpret what has no need of interpretation." If there were
ambiguity or doubt, then such a practice, begun so early and continued so long,
would be in the highest degree persuasive, if not absolutely controlling in its
effect. But with language clear and precise, and with its meaning evident there
is no room for construction, and consequently no need of anything to give it aid.
See also McLaren v. Fleischer, 256 U.S. 477,480-81 (1921) (common practice may determine
meaning of statute when the statute is "fairly susceptible of different constructions"); Swift
& Co. v. United States, 105 U.S. 691, 695 (1881) ("The rule which gives determining weight
to contemporaneous construction, put upon a statute, by those charged with its execution,
applies only in cases of ambiguity and doubt.") (citations omitted); United States v. Temple,
105 U.S. 97, 99 (1881) ("When the language is plain, we have no right to insert words and
phrases, so as to incorporate in the statute a new and distinct provision," and contemporary
practice accordingly does not provide a basis for interpretation); Edwards' Lessee v. Darby,
25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 206,210 (1827) ("In the construction of a doubtful and ambiguous law,
the cotemporaneous construction of those who were called upon to act under the law, and
were appointed to carry its provisions into effect, is entitled to very great respect.").
82. See D.J. Llewelyn Davies, The Interpretation of Statutes in the Light of Their Policy
by the English Courts, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 519 (1935), in which Professor Davies makes the
following comments about early rules of statutory interpretation:
A very marked feature of the common law rules for the construction of written
instruments has been the rigidity with which they excluded all extrinsic
evidence, and their insistence that the meaning of documents must be
ascertained from its words as they stood. This attitude may well have
originated in what Pollock and Maitland call the "mystical awe" with which the
early Common Law regarded the written instrument, and there can be no doubt
but that the particular solemnity attributed to the instrument under seal has
exercised a great influence on the attitude of the courts towards the written
law.
Id at 522; see also LIEBERMAN, supra note 60, at 85. As Professor Lieberman indicated
[tihe relevant distinction between authentic positive law and the common law
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Scalia's commitment to formalism, whereby a court is limited to
statutory text when interpreting statutes,a Justice Scalia's strategy
in responding to Justice Stevens's use of the communis opinio canon
in Brogan is surprising. One would anticipate that Justice Scalia
would have rejected the use of this canon to discern the statute's
meaning because the text of section 1001 is altogether clear.
Instead, though, Justice Scalia asserted that the canon has no
relevance to the interpretation of statutes.
This belief of both classical English legal theorists and Justice
Scalia that a clear statutory text ought to foreclose any resort to
sources of meaning outside the text is suspect for three principal
reasons. First, courts and scholars have recognized that, when
applying written law, blind adherence to text may be inconsistent
with the spirit or purpose of that law." Indeed, concerns about this
inconsistency between the meaning and the spirit of a writing have
been voiced since the heyday of Roman law.85 Second, modern
was carefully delineated by James Sedgwick in his Remarks on the
Commentaries. Sedgwickobservedthat "in the administrationofstatutrylaw"
the magistrate "has only to apply that law to the affairunder trial.""In common
litigations," however, "those general principles which are the essence ofjustice
itself are to be resorted to, and the adjudged cases consulted, with a view to
their application, so far as they are accordant with the spirit of equity, and not
for the mere dictatum of the adjudged case itself."
Id. (quoting JAMES SEDGWICK, REMARKS CRMCAL AND IfSCELLANEOUS ON THE
COMMENTARIES OF SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE 69-70 (London, 1800)). The opposition of many
modem judges and commentators to the formalist method is grounded in large part on the
view that formalism is too wooden and leads to unjust results in particular cases. See Healy,
supra note 3, at 235 n.20.
83. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
84. See Frederick J. De Sloovbre, Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of Statutes, 88 U.
PA. L. REV. 527, 553 (1940). Professor Sloovare notes that
one of the simplest forms of ambiguity is inconsistency between meaning and
purpose. Thus the theory of all satisfactory construction-that all interpretation
must further so far as possible the objectives of the legislation-is curtailed, if
a thoroughgoing, factual search for objectives in extrinsic aids is prevented. A
check-up, on the basis of extrinsic aids, may well show the purpose of the
legislature to be somewhat different from what the text indicates; and when
this occurs, the obvious meaning is no longer plain, as it is now inconsistent
with actual legislative objectives. In short, extrinsic aids may not only show
that what appears to be plain is really ambiguous, but that another meaning
more consonant with the immediate ends of the legislation is more sound and
satisfactory.
Id.
85. Schiller, supra note 64, at 748 ("As Phipson has pointed out, this is nothing more
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judges, including Justice Stevens,86 have taken the position that,
when interpreting statutes, a court should give effect to the intent
of the legislature.'7 In pursuing this intentionalist approach to
interpretation, courts have occasionally determined from a review
of extrinsic evidence that the apparent meaning of the statutory
text is not what the legislature intended. 8 Although this inten-
tionalist approach has been long accepted in the United States,
8 9
English courts have only recently permitted the use of this
approach to interpretation in special cases.' Finally, even if one
were to accept the traditional rule that the statutory text must be
ambiguous before common practice can be used as a source of
statutory meaning, modern theorists have challenged the position
that a text can actually have only a single clear meaning and have
posited that all texts are ambiguous to some degree.91
than the old conflict between verba and voluntas, between the letter and the spirit, or
whatever form expressed, that first takes a prominent place in legal thought in the classical
age of the Roman law.") (footnote omitted); see also Radin, supra note 62, at 402 (explaining
that, according to Aristotle, "in specific instances the written law might be disregarded in
order to effect 'equity,' and that 'equity' soon came only to mean the withdrawal of the
specific case from the application of the law .... That is what insistence on the spirit as
opposed to the letter usually implied in practice .... ") (footnote omitted).
86. See Popkin, supra note 43, at 1149 ("A preference for legislative intent over plain
meaning is often noted by Justice Stevens").
87. See Schiller, supra note 64, at 747. Professor Schiller states:
The specific object of interpretation is, according to Lieber, to find out the true
sense of any form of words, ie., the sense which their author intended to
convey. [Justice Joseph] Story declares that the fundamental rule of the
interpretation of all instruments is to construe them according to the sense of
the terms and the intention of the parties. So, generally, do the writers and the
courts lay emphasis on the sense of the words in the intention of their utterer.
It is at once to be observed that there are two elements herein, the meaning of
the words, and the intention of the writer.
Id (footnotes omitted).
88. See Healy, supra note 3, at 240-41 (discussing Train v. Colorado Public Interest
Research Group, 426 U.S. 1 (1976)).
89. An early statement of this intentionalist approach is included by the Court inAtkins
v. The Disintegrating Co., 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 272,301(1873) (MThe intention of the lawmaker
constitutes the law. Athingmaybe withinthe letterofa statute and notwithin its meaning,
or within its meaning though notwithin its letter.") (footnotes omitted). Moreover, the Court
had relied on legislative history to determine congressional intentmore than tenyears before
Atkins. See Healy, supra note 3, at 233 n.10.
90. See generally id. at note 3.
91. See Schiller, supra note 64, at 746 ("It is now a well-established principle that
interpretation is required for the understanding of all words, not only for those difficult or
obscure.... This is an entirely different conception from that of older times, for it was
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It is unsurprising, therefore, that the Supreme Court has
employed the communis opinio canon in cases in which the Court
has looked beyond the text alone to decide whether an ambiguity
was present. In Brewster v. Gage,92 the Court decided to adhere to
the executive's common practice under a statute, because that
practice "[did] no violence to the letter or spirit of the provisions
assumed that writings properly framed needed no interpretation.") (footnotes omitted);
Frederick J. De Sloov~re, Contextual Interpretation of Statutes, 5 FORDHAML. REV. 219,219
(1936) ("The first canon of interpretation-that ifa statute is plain and explicit it needs no
interpretation-is meaningless, for one can hardly ever say that a statute is plain and
explicit until it has been subjected to the tradition techniques and processes of
interpretation."); cf. Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 705 n.7 (2000) ("English is rich
enough to give even textualists room for creative readings."); Muscarello v. United States,
524 U.S. 125,138 (1998) ("[Most statutes are ambiguous to some degree"). In another article,
I have presented the view that the English requirement that a statutory text must be either
ambiguous, absurd, or obscure before a court may pursue the intentionalist approach to
interpretation has not successfully limited judicial use of intentionalism, because the
requirement can so easily be met. See generally Healy, supra note 3, at 247-50.
This question of the clarity or ambiguity of a text somewhat obscures the underlying issue
of the context in which the text is understood:
To claim, then, as I do, that the phrase the text itself is oxymoronic is to argue
not that formalism is undesirable and that we should stop being formalists but
that formalism is impossible and that no one ever has been a formalist. To read
is always already to have invoked the category of the extrinsic, an invocation
that is denied, as I suggested earlier, not only by avowedly formalist critics but
by all those who think of textual meaning as in any sense intrinsic. Many
contemporary legal and literary theorists, for example, are accustomed to
thinking of language as inherently "ambiguous" or "undecidable," a position
that at least appears to be more responsive to the complexities of contracts and
poems than any doctrine of plain meanings. But the trouble with this account
is that it simply replaces clarity and precision as properties of language with
ambiguity and undecidability. In fact, although some texts are ambiguous, no
texts are inherently ambiguous, and although some texts are precise, no texts
are inherently precise either.... [Nbo text is inherently anything. The
properties we attribute to texts are in fact functions of situations, of the
contexts in which texts are read.
Walter Benn Michaels, Against Formalism: Chickens and Rocks in THE STATE OF THE
LANGUAGE 418-19 (Leonard Michaels & Christopher Ricks eds., 1980); cf John F. Manning,
Constitutional Structure and Statutory Formalism, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 685, 694 n.42 (1999)
("Sometimes texts are precise and clear when considered in their linguistic and cultural
environments.") (citations omitted).
92. 280 U.S. 327, 336 (1930).
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construed."93 In United States v. Pugh,94 the Court considered an
interpretive "question [that] is one by no means free from doubt,"95
and decided to give "great respect" to the administrative practice
that had developed in the implementation of the statute. 6 The
Court stated that it was "not inclined to interfere, at this late day,
with a rule which has been acted upon by the Court of Claims and
the executive for so long a time,"9 and responded to the concern
that the practice conflicted with the statutory text with the
following nontext-based assertion: "If this practice is not supported
by the exact letter of the law, it is by the spirit, and it is certainly
just. We are not disposed to change it."98
The willingness of the Supreme Court to consider more than the
statutory text to determine statutory meaning, including whether
the statute is ambiguous, does not necessarily mean that the canon
will be applied with greater frequency. Because extrinsic evidence
of intent or meaning may eliminate statutory ambiguity as well as
create it, a court that is willing to look to more than a facially
ambiguous statutory text may decide that the communis opinio
canon has no application because other evidence shows that the
statute has a clear meaning. For example, in Jacobs v. Prichard,99
the Court considered the "immediate and continued construction of
the act of Congress by the Interior Department, " "°° and stated that
"such construction would determine against ambiguity in the act
even ifwe should admit ambiguity existed."101 The Court concluded,
however, that "we find no ambiguity in the act when we consider its
93. Id. The Court also indicated.
These regulations were prepared by the department charged with the duty of
enforcing the Acts. The rule so established is reasonable and does no violence
to the letter or spirit ofthe provisions construed. Areversal ofthat construction
would be likely to produce inconvenience and result in inequality. It is the
settled rule that the practical interpretation of an ambiguous or doubtful
statute that has been acted upon by officials charged with its administration
will not be disturbed except for weighty reasons.
Id. (citations omitted).
94. 99 U.S. 265 (1878).
95. Id. at 269.
96. Id-
97. Id.
98. Id,
99. 223 U.S. 200 (1912).
100. Id. at 213-14.
101. Id.
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purpose," and accordingly had no need to employ the communis
opinio canon. 02
In sum, the first requirement for the application of the communis
opinio canon is quite simple to define: The canon may be used only
when the statute at issue is ambiguous. The application of this
requirement is more controversial. Traditionally, and under Justice
Scalia's formalist interpretative method, courts consider only the
statutory text to determine whether it is ambiguous. Nonformalist
judges like Justice Stevens, however, would consider the text and
extrinsic evidence of statutory meaning to determine whether an
ambiguity exists.
2. Contemporary Usage (Including Inaction)
The second requirement for the application of the communis
opinio canon is the existence of a common practice in response to a
statutory provision. Most often, the common practice is defined by
the conduct of the executive or judiciary. Also, the practice of
private parties may be the source of common practice. Less
commonly, well-accepted inaction by groups that are the subject of
a statutory provision may be relied upon by courts to conclude that
a statute does not permit conduct that a group contends is
permitted by the statute.
A striking example of common practice by the government
determining the meaning of a statute occurred in United States v.
Hill.l"' There, the United States had brought an action against the
clerk of the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts, asserting a statutory right to recover money from
the clerk. The applicable statutory provision stated that each
district court clerk must
on the first days of January and July in each year, or within
thirty days thereafter, make to the attorney general, in such
form as he may prescribe, a written return for the half year
ending on said days, respectively, of all the fees and emoluments
of his office of every name and character, and of all the
necessary expenses of his office, including necessary clerk hire,
102. 1l
103. 120 U.S. 169, 182 (1887).
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together with the vouchers for the payment of the same for such
last half year. He shall state separately in such return the fees
and emoluments payable under the bankrupt act.... Said
returns shall be verified by the oath of the officer making
them.104
Despite the breadth of this requirement to report to the Attorney
General "all the fees and emoluments of his office of every name
and character,"'0 5 the clerk conceded that he had not reported the
receipt of certain naturalization fees.'' The parties' agreed
statement of facts presented the clerk's position that the reporting
was lawful because it conformed to the long-standing practice in the
District of Massachusetts:
As clerk, he has made half-yearly returns of fees and
emoluments received by him, but he has not included in the
same the amounts received by him for the naturalization of
aliens in the District Court.
It has been the custom in the United States Courts in the
District of Massachusetts, for a long time, not less than
forty-five years before the date of the writ in the present action,
and known and approved by the judges, for the clerk to charge
one dollar as a fee for a declaration of intention to become a
citizen, and two dollars as a fee for a final naturalization and
certificate thereof; and the clerk of the District Court has never
included these in the fees and emoluments returned by him, and
this has been known to the judges to whom the accounts have
been semi-annually exhibited, and by whom they were passed
without objection in this particular.'0 7
The circuit court, which first reviewed the claim, held in favor of
the clerk. In its decision, quoted at length by the Supreme Court,
the circuit court virtually ignored the broad statutory text that gave
rise to the government's claim and relied instead on the long- and
well-established practice of the Massachusetts court and the fact
that the executive departments never objected to the legality of the
104. Id (quoting MASS. REV. STAT. § 833 (1853)).
105. Id.
106. Id at 171.
107. Id.
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practice.0 8 The circuit court concluded that "[t]his construction of
the statute in practice, concurred in by all the Departments of the
government, and continued for so many years, must be regarded as
absolutely conclusive in its effect."0 9
In its own analysis of the case, the Supreme Court also resisted
any detailed review of the statutory text, and instead asserted that
the text was "doubtful" and therefore the statute's meaning was
determined by the practice of those the statute regulated:
With this long practice, amounting to a contemporaneous and
continuous construction of the statute, in a case where it is
doubtful whether the statute requires a return of the disputed
fees, judges of eminence, heads of departments, and accounting
officers of the Treasury having concurred in an interpretation in
which those concerned have confided, the surety in the present
bond, as well as his principal, had a right to rely on that
interpretation in giving the bond; and the semiannual accounts
of the principal having been actually examined and adjusted at
the Treasury, with the naturalization fees excluded, down to
and including the one last rendered five months before this suit
was brought, a court seeking to administer justice would long
hesitate before permitting the United States to go back, and not
only as against the clerk, but as against the surety on his bond,
reopen what had been settled with such abundant and formal
108. See id. at 180. The circuit court is quoted as stating.
No complaint of these [naturalization] fees has ever come to the ear of the court
from any quarter. On the contrary, this service performed by the clerks has
been of great advantage to those seeking to be admitted as citizens. It has had
the effect, as originally intended, to simplify the process of becoming a citizen,
and to make it more expeditious and inexpensive. It saves the parties the
expense of employing an attorney, and the fee charged therefor is much less
than would be allowed by the fee-bill, if the application is to be treated and
entered on the docket of the court as an ordinary suit. In rejected cases no fee
has been charged. This practice has prevailed for more than forty years, ever
since the act of 1842, which first required returns, and has been perfectly well
known to everybody conversant with the courts. It was begun by Judge Story
and Judge Sprague, and has had the approval of all the judges of this district
since their day. It has also had the sanction successively of the Department of
the Treasury, the Department of the Interior, and the Department of Justice.
Until this suit was brought, it has never been called in question by any
accounting officer of the government; nor has Congress seen fit to put a stop to
it by legislation.
Id. (quoting United States v. Hill, 25 F. 375, 379 (C.C. Mass. 1885)).
109. Id. (citations omitted).
566 [Vol. 43:539
20011 INTERPRETING LAW OR CHANGING LAW 567
sanction. This principle has been applied, as a wholesome one,
for the establishment and enforcement ofjustice, in many cases
in this court, not only between man and man, but between the
government and those who deal with it, and put faith in the
action of its constituted authorities, judicial, executive, and
administrative.11 °
In sum, common practice is often determined by government
practice and may be defined by the actions of the executive,"' the
judiciary,"2 or the legislature."'
110. Id at 182.
111. For an additional example of the Court's reliance on the common practice within the
executive branch, see Surgett v. Lapice, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 48, 68 (1850), where the Court
concluded:
The foregoing construction being the one adopted by the departments of public
lands soon after the act of 1832 went into operation, we should feel ourselves
restrained, unless the error of construction was plainly manifest, from
disturbing the practice prescribed by the Commissioner of the General Land
Office, acting in accordance with the opinion of the Attorney-General, and
which had the sanction of the Secretary of the Treasury and of the President of
the United States.
See also Schell v. Fauche, 138 U.S. 562, 572 (1891) ("In all cases of ambiguity, the
contemporaneous construction, not only of the courts but of the departments, and even of the
officials whose duty it is to carry the law into effect, is universally held to be controlling.")
(citations omitted); United States v. Burlington & Mo. River R.R. Co., 98 U.S. 334,341(1879)
("Such has been the uniform construction given to the acts by all departments of the
government. ... This uniform actionis as potential, and as conclusive of the soundness of the
construction, as if it had been declared by judicial decision. It cannot at this day be called in
question.").
112. For a case relying on the common practice of courts, see Hill v. Tohill, 80 N.E. 253
(M. 1907). The court stated:
To sustain the appellee's contention now would be to unsettle that which has
for well-nigh 50 years been tacitly held by the courts of the state to be the law,
and would be to destroy property rights which have grown up and been
established on the theory that this statute was enforceable. This law having
been regarded as valid and enforced without question as to its constitutionality
by this court and other courts of the state since 1857, we would not now be
justified in holding it to be unconstitutional unless its invalidity was clear,
certain, and beyond question. ... While the question under discussion might in
the first instance have presented some difficulty, the statute here challenged
must now be regarded as a proper exercise of the police power.
I& at 256 (citations omitted); see also United States v. Pugh, 99 U.S. 265, 269 (1878); cf
HENRY M. HART, J., & ALBERT M. SACHS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIc PROBLEMS iN THE
MAMNG AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1379 (William N. Eskridge, Jr., & Philip P. Frickey eds.,
1994), where the authors state:
The court's own prior interpretations of a statute in related applications should
be accepted, on the principle of stare decisis, unless they are manifestly out of
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The application of the communis opinio canon may, however, be
based on a practice that does not involve any of the three branches
of government, but rather looks toward how private, affected
parties understand the statutory provision. Moreover, although
evidence of the common practice will usually be based on
affirmative actions taken under the statute, a court may also look
to inaction in defining the communis opinio. In Atkins v. The
Disintegrating Co.,114 the Supreme Court had to construe the scope
of the grant of admiralty jurisdiction in section 11 of the Judiciary
Act, which provided that "no civil suit shall be brought before either
of said courts, against an inhabitant of the United States, by any
original process in any other district than that whereof he is an
inhabitant, or in which he shall be found at the time of serving the
writ.""5 In this admiralty action, the defendant argued that the
district court lacked jurisdiction because the action was a "civil
suit" and the action was not brought in a district where the
defendant was an inhabitant." 6 In addition to considering the
meaning of the statutory text, the Court found significance in the
fact that in earlier admiralty cases "the [jurisdictional] point here
accord with other indications of purpose. Once these applications are treated as
fixed, they serve as points of reference for juristic thinking in the same fashion
as verbally clear applications in the case of a new statute.
Judicial practice need not be in the form ofjudicial opinions to constitute communis opinio.
In F.T.C. v. Mandel Bros., Inc., 359 U.S. 385, 391 (1959) (citations omitted), the Supreme
Court stated that "[t]his contemporaneous construction is entitled to great weight even
though it was applied in cases settled by consent rather than in litigation." Accord E.I. du
Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Collins, 432 U.S. 46 (1977).
113. For an example ofreliance on legislative practice to discern the meaning of a text, see
Fairbank v. United States, 181 U.S. 283, 322 (1901), where Justice Harlan, dissenting for
four Members of the Court, concluded that a long practice of statutory enactments showed
the meaning of the Constitution's text:
Many cases have been cited which hold that the uniform, contemporaneous
construction by executive officers charged with the enforcement of a doubtful or
ambiguous law is entitled to great weight and should not be overturned unless
it be plainly or obviously erroneous. If such respect be accorded to the action of
mere executive officers, how much greater respect is due to the legislative
department when it has at different periods in the history of the country
exercised a power as belonging to it under the Constitution, and no one in the
course of a century questioned the existence of the power so exercised.
114. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 272 (1873).
115. Id. at 300-01.
116. Id. at 274.
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under consideration was not adverted to either by the court or the
counsel."" 7 The Court stated, moreover, that
[n]either in the rules of this court nor in either of the cases
referred to is there any reference, express or implied, to the
eleventh section of the act of 1789. It does not seem to have
occurred to any one that the limitations in that section could
have any application to proceedings in admiralty."8
The Court then stated its conclusion that [t]hese facts are full
of significance. They are hardly less effectual than an express
authoritative negation upon the subject."1" In sum, the Court found
the practices of the admiralty bar as forming a solid basis for
understanding the meaning of the Judiciary Act.
The Court also relied on broad and accepted inaction to hold that
the federal circuit courts do not "exercise a common law jurisdiction
in criminal cases." ° The first argument offered by the Court to
support this conclusion was the following.
Although this question is brought up now for the first time to be
decided by this Court, we consider it as having been long since
settled in public opinion. In no other case for many years has
this jurisdiction been asserted; and the general acquiescence of
legal men shews the prevalence of opinion in favor of the
negative of the proposition."
An English court applied the canon in a similar manner when it
considered that there had been no attempt over a long period of
years to apply written law in a particular manner and therefore
found a basis for concluding that the law foreclosed the novel
application when it was finally proposed." Likewise, in Fairbank
117. I at 305.
118. I at 305-06.
119. IdL at 306 (footnote omitted).
120. United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32,32 (1812).
121. Mo
122. In Rex v. St. Edmundsbury & Ipswich Diocese, 2 All E.&. 604, 604-05 (KB. 1946)
(citation and footnote omitted), the court held that the writ of certiorari sought by the
claimant was not available for the following reason:
It would be sufficient for this court to say, when they find that from the earliest
days of the King's courts no writ ofcertiorari has ever been shown to have been
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v. United States,' Justice Harlan, dissenting on behalf of four
Members of the Court, relied on the fact that, for many years, no
objection had been registered to an application of written law, as he
argued that the Court should hold that the commonly accepted
application is proper.'
To be sure, though, situations in which those affected by a statute
or the Constitution have done nothing, rather than identifying
through decisions or actions their understanding of the law, are
likely to be viewed by courts as providing a far more tenuous basis
for defining common practice. Indeed, one English court rejected a
party's contention that the court should decline to adopt a proposed
interpretation of a statute because it had not previously been
advocated for the more than two hundred years the statute had
been in effect. 125 Instead, like the Supreme Court majority in
issued by this court to an ecclesiastical court, that it is far too late now to come
and ask this court to make a precedent and order a certiorari to issue. True, as
I shall show later, prohibition has lain to the ecclesiastical courts since the 12th
century, and probably earlier, but no trace can be found of a certiorari ever
having been granted or even moved. As I said in the course of the argument,
Lord Ellenborough in Isherwood v. Oldknow, said that communis opinio is
evidence of what the law is, and it seems abundantly clear that there has been
a communis opinio among lawyers that certiorari does not lie, because in the
hundreds of cases which have come before the King's courts in the old days and
afterwards in this court in which an excess of jurisdiction has been alleged
against a spiritual court, there is no trace that counsel has ever attempted to
obtain more than a prohibition or suggested that certiorari has been granted.
123. 181 U.S. 283 (1901).
124. In his dissent in Fairbank, Justice Harlan raised the following objection:
Practically no weight has been given in the opinion just filed to the fact that the
power now denied to Congress has been exercised since the organization of the
Government without any suggestion or even intimation by a single jurist or
statesman during all that period that the Constitution forbade its exercise. It
is said that the question of power never was presented for judicial
determination prior to the present case, and therefore this court is at liberty to
determine the matter as if now for the first time presented. But the answer to
that suggestion is that, in view of the frequent legislation by Congress and its
enforcement for nearly a century, the question must have arisen if it had been
supposed by any one that such legislation infringed the constitutional rights of
the citizen. Within the rule announced in Stuart v. Laird, and in other cases,
the questions should be considered at rest.
Id. at 323 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
125. See Hickman v. Potts, 3 All E.R. 794, 802 (C.A. 1939). The court presented the
following discussion:
It remains for us to deal with what was the main strength of the argument of
counsel for the respondent, that this point has never been taken in the 230
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Fairbank, the English Court of Appeal viewed the case as "one in
which we have to decide for the first time a question which might
well have arisen before, but never has done so.
" 126
In sum, the practice, and in certain circumstances the inaction,
of the executive, the judiciary, and the legislature, as well as
affected private parties, may identify communis opinio to a court
and thereby fix the meaning of statutory or constitutional text.
C. Interpretive Effect of the Canon's Application
Once a court has determined that the communis opinio canon
applies to the resolution of the interpretive issue, it must define the
interpretive effect of applying the canon. A leading casebook on
the subject of statutory construction posits that courts may give a
range of legal effects to substantive canons when interpreting
legislation.' Under this view, a canon's impact may vary from
years during which the Act has been in force. Now, this is not a case in which
an appellate court is asked to reverse a decision of long standing on the faith of
which persons have acquired rights and ordered their affairs. It is one in which
we have to decide for the first time a question which might well have arisen
before, but never has done so. It is fruitless to attempt an inquiry as to the
reason for this silence, not only of decided cases, but of text writers. Certainly
one would have thought that Hutchins v. Chambers would have encouraged
landlords to raise it, or text writers to discuss it. Even if we assume that those
whose business it is to levy distress for rates have been long of opinion that the
Act does not apply, this affords no ground for perpetuating the error.
"Communis errorfacitjus" is a maxim of very limited application; it is truer to
say-as was said by Lord Ellenborough, C.J., in Isherwood v.
Oldknow--"communis opinio is evidence of what the law is," but here there is
no trace of a communis opinio among lawyers. And if there has been prevalent
an erroneous view of the Act, it is clear that no one has acquired rights in
consequence; the most that can be said is that landlords have perhaps been
induced to refrain from exercising the right given them by the Act in the
particular case of distress for rates. Whether it is desirable in modem
conditions that the landlord should have a preference over the rating authority
is a matter for the legislature, and not for the courts. We are bound to decide
the case according to what we believe to be the true view of the law.
Id. (citations omitted).
126. Id.
127. ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 1, at 655. See also Sunstein, supra note 2, at 650,
where Professor Sunstein makes the following statements about the different effects of rules
of construction:
[Slome interpretive rules are based on public policy and inalienable; they are,
in that sense, far more than mere default rules. Constitutional law amounts to
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providing a tiebreaker when the meaning is uncertain in the
absence of the canon, to determining a presumptive meaning of the
statute that may be overcome by other, stronger evidence of
statutory meaning, to compelling the statutory meaning in the
absence of an alternative clear or even super-clear statement. 28
Courts employing the communis opinio canon have given the
canon each of these various effects, regardless of whether they
actually defined the legal effect of applying the canon or expressly
analyzed whether one effect or another of the canon was proper- 129
A limitation on the application of the canon that likely would be
generally accepted as a matter of theory is that common practice
cannot change what a statute otherwise requires; that communis
error does not facitjus i 0 This limit, however, is most uncertain,
the equivalent of inalienable default rules for statutory interpretation; ofcourse
Congress is not permitted to contract around constitutional requirements.
These points are pretty obvious, but a less obvious point is in the background:
There is a continuum from "other things being equal" default rules to
"superstrong" default rules, which require an especially clear statement from
the parties or from Congress, to genuinely inalienable default rules.
128. ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 1, at 655; see also SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 189
("Some of these principles [of statutory construction] tell courts what to do when the
interpretive enterprise otherwise leaves judges in equipoise. Some of them are not just
tiebreakers, but impose a presumption, one that can be overcome only through a 'clear
statement' from the legislature.").
129. Such debates about the legal effect of the application of a canon are relatively rare.
Professors Eskridge and Frickey discuss one example of such a debate in a recent article.
William N. Eskridge & Phillip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court 1993 Term: Law as
Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26,85-87 (1994). In the case they discuss, Hagen v. Utah, 510
U.S. 399 (1994), the Court majority concluded that the canon calling for a strict construction
of statutes diminishing the size of Indian reservations was a tiebreaker canon, and rejected
the contention that the canon established a clear statement requirement. Id at 411-12; see
also Astoria Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108-10 (1991) (contrasting a
canon defining a "presumption... properly accorded sway onlyupon legislative default" with
a canon "that entails a requirement of clear statement, to the effect that Congress must state
precisely any intention to overcome the presumption's application"); cf Shalala v. Illinois
Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 32 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (distinguishing
between a "presumption," which "suggests that some unusually clear statement is required
by way of negation," and a "background rule, which can be displaced by any reasonable
implication... from the statute").
130. See United States v. The Reindeer, 27 F. Cas. 758, (C.C.D.R.I. 1861) (No. 16,145) ("[A]
usage or custom which violates an express law, created by statute or perhaps any other way,
may not protect one who breaks the law.") (citations omitted); Rogan v. Baltimore & 0. R.
Co., 52 A2d 261, 268 (Md. 1947) ("No custom, however venerable, can nullify the plain
meaning and purpose of a statute.").
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because different courts may reach different conclusions about what
the statute understood in context otherwise requires.
1. Communis Opinio as Tiebreaker
Employing a canon as a tiebreaker to resolve any statutory
ambiguity would appear to be a well-accepted and long-standing
use of a rule of construction. To the extent that the canon is well-
known, a court may defend this application of the canon because
the legislature could have avoided its application by providing a
statute that was not ambiguous. 31
In Brown v. United States,"2 the parties disagreed about whether
a statutory provision "applie[d] only to commissioned officers, and
not to warrant officers, to which latter class Brown belonged." 3
The Court "conceded that were the question a new one the true
construction of the section would be open to doubt."' The practice
of the President and the Navy Department following enactment of
the statute was to apply the provision to both groups of
servicemembers. The Court held that "t]his contemporaneous and
uniform interpretation is entitled to weight in the construction of
the law, and in a case of doubt ought to turn the scale."3'3 Many
applications of the communis opinio canon discussed in earlier
sections of this Article indicate that the courts often have taken this
tiebreaker approach to the legal effect of the canon.
Despite the fact that this approach to the application of canons
is well accepted, the tiebreaker approach still may result in
controversy. If the court disagrees about whether the statute is
ambiguous, then the court will disagree about allowing the canon
to determine the statute's meaning. For example, the majority in
McNally v. United States3 5 applied the rule of lenity in explaining
its narrow interpretation of a criminal prohibition.3 7 The dissenters
argued that the majority discerned an ambiguity where none was
131. Cf Sunstein, supra note 2, at 645-50 (analogizing rules of statutory construction to
default rules against the background of which Congress legislates).
132. 113 U.S. 568 (1885).
133. Id. at 570.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 571.
136. 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
137. Id at 356-57, 360-61.
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present and the rule of lenity did not apply because the statute had
a broad and determinate meaning.' Another potential criticism of
giving this effect to this or any other canon is that Congress may
have had no reason to know of the canon as a default rule and
accordingly could not have been expected to direct a specific reading
of the statute with particular clarity.' 39 There are two reasons why
this criticism lacks real force regarding the communis opinio canon.
First, unlike other substantive canons, the communis opinio rule is
not based on a court's view of the default rules for substantive
legislation, for which the court assumes the legislature has
accounted in its statutory text. 40 The effect of the communis opinio
canon turns on how the legislation is understood by affected parties,
rather than a court's potentially shifting views of the background
norms of legislation. Second, this canon is based on common
practice in response to the statutory scheme. In other words, the
default rule is based on an accepted practice, one which Congress
would know and could change by a statutory amendment if it
considered the practice to be inconsistent with the statute.141
In sum, the use of communis opinio to break the tie inhering
in an ambiguous statutory text is well-established and noncon-
troversial.
2. Communis Opinio as Presumptive Meaning
In several decisions, the Supreme Court has stated that the legal
effect of communis opinio is to identify the presumptive meaning of
the statutory text, one that may be overcome only by a showing of
an "error of construction" that is "plainly manifest."" 2 Because the
138. Id. at 375-76.
139. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 129, at 85. The dissenters in Vermont Agency of
Natural Resources v. United States, 529 U.S. 765 (2000), objected for this reason to the
majority's application of a clear statement requirement when interpreting the federal qui
tam statute. Id. at 789-96 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
140. See ESKRIDGE & FRICIUY, supra note 1, at 654.
141. But see infra notes 233-34 and accompanying text (discussing the view that
congressional inaction is not good evidence of congressional intent).
142. In Surgett v. Lapice, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 48 (1850), the Court's analysis of the effect of
communis opinio was the following:
The manifest object of Congress was to disembarras [sic] public sales by
barring preference rights that would be a cloud on the title of lands thus
offered.
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Courts that characterized the canons effect in this way also decided
that the common practice reflected a reasonable reading of the
statutory texts, the Courts had no occasion to define the
circumstances under which a party would be able to overcome the
presumptive meaning fixed by the communis opinio.'1 Moreover,
the difference in the legal effects of tiebreaker and presumptive
meaning may be no more than rhetorical.'
3. Communis Opinio as Clear Statement Rule
In special circumstances, communis opinio has had an effect
more significant than tiebreaker or presumptive meaning. In these
cases, the Supreme Court has given communis opinio the effect of
determining a statutes meaning, notwithstanding conflicting
statutory text. When Chief Justice Marshall applied the canon in
M'Keen, 45 he construed the statute in accordance with communis
opinio, despite the fact that the custom was contrary to the plain
meaning of the statute's text. The Court interpreted the statute to
conform to communis opinio because it did not wish to jeopardize
The foregoing construction being the one adopted by the departments of
public lands soon after the act of 1832 went into operation, we should feel
ourselves restrained, unless the error of construction was plainly manifest,
from disturbing the practice prescribed by the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, acting in accordance with the opinion ofthe Attorney-General, and
which had the sanction of the Secretary of the Treasury and ofthe President of
the United States.
Id. at 68; see also Universal Battery Co. v. United States, 281 U.S. 580, 583 (1929) (,Ihis
construction of those [statutory] terms has been adhered to in the Internal Revenue Bureau
for about ten years and it ought not to be disturbed now unless it be plainly wrong. We think
it is not so, but is an admissible construction."); United States v. State Bank of N.C., 31 U.S.
(6 Pet.) 29, 30 (1832) (MThe construction of the law of the United States now claimed, had
been thatofuniversal practice sinceitwas enacted.... This received construction willinduce
the court to hesitate before it will adopt another... ."); id. at 39-40 (stating that a long held
practice lent strong support "for a liberal construction; and could not now be disturbed
without introducing a train of serious mischiefs" and that "the practice was founded in the
true exposition of the terms and intent of the act; but if it were susceptible of some doubt, so
long an acquiescence in it would justify us in yielding to it as a safe and reasonable
exposition").
143. See cases cited supra note 142.
144. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 129, at 68 ("Virtually all of the textual and
referential canons are 'presumptions' of meaning; they are merely a factor to be considered,
or a tiebreaker in close cases.").
145. M'Keen v. Delancy's Lessee, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 22 (1809).
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
the security of property interests established in reliance on
communis opinio.'46 Similarly, the Court's decision in United States
v. Hill'47 relied on the long-standing practice of district court clerks
not reporting the receipt of fees in immigration cases to limit the
scope of a statute requiring the reporting of "all the fees and
emoluments" 4" of the clerk's office.149 To be sure, the Hill Court
protested that the meaning of the statute's text was "doubtful.""50
Nevertheless, the only fair conclusion is that the Court relied
on the canon in a manner that conflicted with the statutory
text. Justice Stevens's application of the communis opinio canon
in Brogan would have given similar preclusive effect to custom,
notwithstanding the broadly stated prohibition in the False
Statements Act.
Application of the canon in Hill and Brogan had the effect of
limiting the scope of a statute's broad and general language. In
giving this effect to the canon, the Justices relying on the canon
engaged in a use of canons that is increasingly important in the
Rehnquist Court's jurisprudence. Commentators on the Supreme
Court's recent statutory interpretation decisions have described the
Court's tendency to fashion some rules of construction as requiring
that the legislature provide a clear textual statement before the
Court will reach certain interpretive results.1 5'
146. See id. at 32, where the Court presents the following discussion:
Were this act of 1715 now, for the first time, to be construed, the opinion of
this court would certainly be, that the deed was not regularly proved. Ajustice
of the supreme court would not be deemed a justice of the county, and the
decision would be, that the deed was not properly proved, and therefore not
legally recorded.
But, in construing the statutes of a state on which land titles depend, infinite
mischiefwould ensue, should this court observe a different rule from that which
has been long established in the state; and in this case, the court cannot doubt
that the courts of Pennsylvania consider a justice of the supreme court as
within the description of the act.
147. 120 U.S. 169 (1887).
148. Id. at 172 (quoting MASS. REV. STAT. § 833 (1853)).
149. See id. at 180 ("This construction of the statute in practice, concurred in by all the
Departments of the government, and continued for so many years, must be regarded as
absolutely conclusive in its effect.") (citations omitted).
150. Id. at 182.
151. For example, Professors Eskridge and Frickey wrote:
Some of the substantive canons, however, have now been developed as more
powerful "clear statement rules," which are presumptions that can only be
rebutted by clear statements in the statutory text. The Coures choice to
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This transformation in the treatment that certain canons of
construction receive can be observed in the Court's changing
attitude toward the canon that statutes are to be interpreted to
avoid a constitutional question. The traditional application of this
canon requires a court to apply a tiebreaking rule in favor of an
interpretation of the statute that does not raise a question of
constitutional infirmity, provided that the interpretation is "fairly
possible."'52 In National Labor Relations Board v. Catholic Bishop
of Chicago,"s Chief Justice Burger redefined the legal effect of this
canon to require that there be a "clear expression of an affirmative
intention of Congress"' before the Court will construe a statute "in
a manner that could in turn call upon the Court to resolve difficult
and sensitive" constitutional questions.155 The Court's interpretive
method in Catholic Bishop indicated that Congress could express its
clear intent in statutory text or in the legislative history."5
The Rehnquist Court has further modified the effect of at least
some canons grounded in constitutional values. In Gregory v.
AShcroft,157 the Court held that, before it will construe a statute in
a way that raises a question of constitutionality, "it must be plain
to anyone reading the Act" that it has a constitutionally
articulate a canon as a clear statement rule rather than as a presumption not
only imposes a higher burden on those seeking to trump the canon, but signals
the intensity of the Court's preferences.
Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 129, at 68-69 (footnote omitted).
Professor Popkin has written that Justice Stevens has fashioned clear statement rules
when particular interpretive questions are at issue as well:
These tests for piercing the veil of statutory language are versions of the "clear
statement" doctrine, which posits that certain substantive results will be
inferred only when the statutory language clearly impels it. Justice Stevens
applies this doctrine when he rejects the apparent meaning of the statutory
language because it produces results that he "cannot believe" the legislature
intended without a clear statement to that effect, especially if Congress seems
unaware of what it is doing.
Popkin, supra note 43, at 1152 (footnotes omitted).
152. See, e.g., International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 749-50 (1961);
Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
153. 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
154. Id. at 504.
155. Id- at 507.
156. See id. at 504-07 (examining statutory text and legislative history for evidence of any
afirmative intention of Congress).
157. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
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questionable meaning." Although this last change may reflect only
the fact that the Court has become more formalist in its approach
to interpretation, the change does mean that the clear statement
must be in the text, rather than in the legislative history.'59 This
requirement of clear text goes beyond the rationale of Catholic
Bishop, which sought to ensure congressional deliberation on the
question of constitutional import, and runs a serious risk of
disingenuous interpretive results when the question of
constitutional doubt is one that the Court identified after the
statute was enacted. 60 By using these rules, the Court may
improperly present an interpretive result as consistent with
principles of legislative supremacy, when the Court itself is actually
imposing the legal rule.''
158. Id. at 467.
159. A more cynical view of the use of these clear statement rules by formalists would be
that the Court's formalists have found that they need to have rules of construction available
to them that will trump the plain, though not explicit, meaning of broadly written statutory
text when the formalists view the interpretive result directed by the text as objectionable.
160. This general point was made fifty years ago with regard to the aggressive use of
canons:
Rules of interpretation in the nature of presumptions are the hardest with
which to deal. They are fictional rules of interpretation and frequently lead to
results exactly opposite those which legislatures intend. At best they are
judicial standards requiring a particular form of legislative expression. As such,
they are within limits defensible. Every system of government depends upon
the ability of society to require of its people certain formalities as prerequisite
to legal consequence. It is not too much to require this of the agencies of
government as well. Formalities, however, become intolerable when they no
longer reflect the normal expectations of the society for which they were
constructed. To test thus the rules ofpresumed intention discloses that they are
altogether unsatisfactory.
Frank E. Horack, Jr., The Disintegration of Statutory Construction, 24 IND. L.J. 335, 342-43
(1949).
161. Hart and Sacks make a similar point:
[The principle of institutional settlement], obviously forbids a court to
substitute its own ideas for what the legislature has duly enacted. What the
legislature has thus enacted should not be frustrated or defeated. What it has
not thus enacted should be declared to be law, if at all, only upon the court's
independent responsibility and not upon a pretense of legislative responsibility.
HART & SACKS, supra note 112, at 1194-95; see Horack, supra note 160, at 345 ("Numerous
other rules of presumption [in statutory construction] serve the function of shifting policy
determination from the legislature to the court."); cf De Sloovbre, supra note 91, at 236. De
Sloovbre notes:
Presumptions and maxims must be relegated to the secondary position of
justifying ... the conclusions reached. Indeed, this ... has been going on in
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As applied by the Court in M'Keen and Hill and by Justice
Stevens in Brogan, communis opinio has an effect that is quite
similar to a clear statement rule for the Rehnquist Court. When
employed in this way, communis opinio seems appropriate because
it would tend to foreclose major changes in the law that may not
have been intended by the legislature and were not, given the
common practice that developed under the statute, generally
understood to result from the legislative enactment.162 This
statutory interpretation for centuries, with the result that the writers ofdigests
and texts have been erroneously elaborating the maxims rather than dealing
directly with actual problems of interpretation as found in the case law.
Id.
This concern should not be read so broadly as to condemn the whole enterprise of
fashioning rules for construing statutes. Professors Eskridge and Frickey, for example,
describe the value of establishing an "interpretive regime":
An interpretive regime is a system of background norms and conventions
against which the Court will read statutes. An interpretive regime tells lower
court judges, agencies, and citizens how strings of words in statutes will be
read, what presumptions will be entertained as to statutes's [sic] scope and
meaning, and what auxiliary materials might be consulted to resolve
ambiguities. Interpretive regimes serve both rule-of-law and coordination
purposes. The integrity of an interpretive regime provides some degree of
insulation against judicial arbitrariness; by rendering statutory interpretation
more predictable, regular, and coherent, interpretive regimes can contribute to
the rule of law.
Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 129, at 66; see also id. at 66-67 (describing the "institutional
coordination functions" served by defining an interpretive regime: "The Court can perform
a valuable coordinating function by generating 'off-the-rack,' gap-filling rules that are
accessible ex ante to the drafters. Knowing the interpretive regime into which statutes will
be developed over time, the players in the legislative bargaining process will be better able
to predict what effects different statutory language will have."). Professor Sunstein has also
argued that courts may limit the costs of uncertainty of statutory interpretation by
prescribing well-defined rules of construction. See Sunstein, supra note 2, at 650.
As I argue in the text, the objection that a clear statement rule will result in courts
interpreting statutes in ways unintended by the legislature does not have much force in the
context of the use of communis opinio as a clear statement rule.
162. For this reason, a court's application of the communis opinio canon as a clear
statement rule does not raise the concerns about judicial activism voiced by Dean Pound in
the early twentieth century-
There are two ways in which the courts impede or thwart social legislation
demanded by the industrial conditions of today. The first is narrow and illiberal
construction of constitutional provisions, state and federal.... The second is a
narrow and illiberal attitude toward legislation conceded to be constitutional,
regarding it as out of place in the legal system, as an alien element to be held
down to the strictest limits and not to be applied beyond the requirements of its
express language. The second is by no means so conspicuous as the first, but is
not on that account the less unfortunate or the less dangerous.
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constraining, conservative use of communis opinio seems quite
consistent with the historical roots of the ancient canon.16 This
clear statement application of communis opinio also is consistent
with the rule of clear statement that the Supreme Court, and
Justice Stevens in particular, occasionally has applied when the
interpretive issue is whether a legislative enactment has changed
a settled and clear pre-existing legal rule. On those occasions, the
Court has declined to give a broad, unsettling effect to the text in
the absence of either a clear statement in the text or clear
deliberation and expression of intent in the legislative history.1 '
Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383,385 (1908).
163. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
164. See Chisomv. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380,396(1991) ("We reject that construction because
we are convinced that if Congress had such an intent, Congress would have made it explicit
in the statute, or at least some of the Members would have identified ormentioned it at some
point in the unusually extensive legislative history of the 1982 amendment.") (footnote
omitted); American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606,613-14 (1991) ("If this amendment
had been intended to place the important limitation on the scope of the Board's rulemaking
powers that petitioner suggests, we would expect to find some expression of that intent in
the legislative history.") (citation omitted); Williams v. United States, 458 U.S. 279 (1982)
(explaining that if Congress intended for a statute to be a national bad check law, "it did so
with a peculiar choice of language and in an unusually backhanded manner.... Absent
support in the legislative history for the proposition that [the statute] was 'designed to have
general application to the passing of worthless checks;' we are not prepared to hold
petitioner's conduct proscribed by that particular statute.") (citation and footnote omitted).
This approach is often recognized by the allusion to Sherlock Holmes's use of the evidence
of the dog that did not bark. See Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors Inc., 458 U.S. 564,588-89 &
n.20 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing A. CONAN DOYLE, Silver Blaze, in THE COMPLET
SHERLOCKHOLME 383 (1938)); Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., 446 U.S. 578,602 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("In a case where the construction of legislative language such as
this makes so sweeping and so relatively unorthodox a change as that made here, I think
judges as wellas detectives may take into consideration the fact that awatchdog did not bark
in the night."). As these citations indicate, Justice Stevens has been particularly supportive
of this approach. See Popkin, supra note 43, at 1152 (Justice Stevens applies this [clear
statement] doctrine when he rejects the apparent meaning of the statutory language because
it produces results that he'cannotbelieve' the legislature intended without a clear statement
to that effect, especially if Congress seems unaware of what it is doing.") (footnote omitted).
This clear statement approach has distinguished scholarly support from Professors
Wellington and Albert, who wrote:
[Tihe invocation of the clear statement rule would seem appropriate... where
one interpretation of a statute would work vast and far-reaching changes in an
established body of jurisprudence, either statutory or common law. Such
changes in a body of existing doctrine is not a factor Congress is likely to have
considered in passing a statute, and the disruption worked by such a statute is
a consideration worthy of legislative attention.
Harry H. Wellington & Lee A. Albert, Statutory Interpretation and the Political Process: A
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Actual practice that is sufficient to establish communis opinio and
that has arisen pursuant to the statutory text at issue in the case
should, in fact, provide a surer foundation for a presumptive
statutory meaning than in the context where the legislature has
acted after the practice has developed.
The use of communis opinio to define a clear statement rule,
however, contrasts sharply with the use to which formalists put
clear statement rules when they are viewed as needed to overcome
an otherwise clear statutory meaning-in those cases, the Court's
new clear statement rules yield interpretations unlikely to have
been intended by Congress, in circumstances in which Congress had
no reason to anticipate a need to be any more specific in defining its
intent. 1
65
Comment on Sinclair v. Atkinson, 72 YALE L.J. 1547, 1563 n.50 (1963).
Other decisions, however, have rejectedthis interpretive approach. See Chisom, 501 U.S.
at 406 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (W]e have forcefully and explicitly rejected the Conan Doyle
approach'to statutory construction in the past. We are here to apply the statute, not
legislative history, and certainly not the absence of legislative history. Statutes are the law
though sleeping dogs ie.") (citations omitted); PPG Industries, 446 U.S. at 592 ("[I]t would
be a strange canon of statutory construction that would require Congress to state in
committee reports or elsewhere in its deliberations that which is obvious on the face of a
statute. In ascertaining the meaning ofa statute, a court cannot, .... pursue the theory of the
dog that did not bark.") (footnote omitted).
165. Professors Eskridge and Frickey have criticized the Court's use of clear statement
rules in some recent cases as evidencing a "bait and switch7 approach to statutory
interpretation:
[Two recent] decisions surely came as a surprise to Congress. Indeed, there is
a "bait and switch" feature to [these] cases ... when Congress enacted the
statutesin question, the constitutionality of the state-infringing provisions was
clear and Congress could not have anticipated the Gregory rule; nor could a
reasonable observer have predicted the expansion of Gregory in [the second
case]. When the Courts practice induces Congress to behave in a certain way
and the Court then switches the rules, Congress justifiably feels taken.
Eskridge and Frickey, supra note 129, at 85 (footnote omitted). These authors also made the
following telling criticism of the formalists' recent use ofclear statement rules:
When candidly set forth and applied, clear statement rules are amongthe many
ways the Court can signal to Congress its concerns about the constitutionality
of government actions. But when the Court transparently manipulates the
canons to fit its own substantive agenda, the Court places its credibility and
legitimacy at risk. Like the Court's erratic textualist performance in statutory
cases, its application of quasi-constitutional clear statement rules has been
tactically clever in the short-term but institutionally risky in the longer-term.
The Court's adventurism has been most apparent, and most normatively
questionable, in the super-strong clear statement rules protecting states' rights
at the expense of individual rights and national policies.
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In sum, the Court, in different cases, has given the communis
opinio canon all of the various effects that may result from a
canon's application. When given the strongest possible canonical
effect-the effect of foreclosing an interpretive result unless that
result is directly compelled by the specific, rather than general
terms of the statute-communis opinio does not raise the serious
concerns of judicial limitation on legislative supremacy that are
associated with the Supreme Court's application of super-clear
statement rules in some of its recent statutory cases.
III. THE REASON OF COMMUNIS OPINIO AND ITS RELATION TO
INTERPRETIVE METHODS
The previous part, by describing the source of the canon and the
requirements for and effect of its application, presented strong
reasons to reject Justice Scalia's claim that the communis opinio
canon has no application to the interpretation of statutes. The
Article now responds to Justice Scalia's view that communis opinio
is simply an unsound basis for interpreting a statute and will lead
to erroneous judicial decisions. 66 Justice Scalia's attack is
considered in light of the rationale for the canon and the strength
of that rationale. Use of this canon may be supported by the
following four factors: communis opinio is telling evidence of the
contextual meaning of a statute; communis opinio indicates the
intent of the drafters of the statute; communis opinio establishes a
strong reliance interest that ought to be recognized; and communis
opinio has a significant place in the development of law and that
place should be recognized by courts when they play their
interpretive role in the development of statutory law. The strength
of three of the four reasons for the canon-contextual meaning,
reliance, and development of law-seem so strong that they show
a flaw in the formalist approach advocated by Justice Scalia, which
categorically rejects any application of communis opinio in cases of
statutory construction.
Id. at 81-82 (footnote omitted).
166. See Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 406-07 (1998).
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A Contextual Meaning
In their classic work, The Legal Process, Professors Hart and
Sacks provide a forceful rationale for the use of communis opinio as
a valuable aid in the interpretation of a statute:
[An administrative or popular construction] affords weighty
evidence that the words may bear the meaning involved. In the
absence of reasons of self-interest or the like for discounting the
construction, it is persuasive evidence that the meaning is a
natural one. Considerations of the stability of transactions and
of existing understandings counsel in favor of its acceptance, if
possible. In cases where the construction has been widely
accepted and consistently adhered, it may be said to fix the
meaning-to be the meaning which experience has demon-
strated the words to bear.167
Stating this rationale in somewhat different terms, Hart and
Sacks also contend that the common practice that emerges out of a
common understanding of a statute indicates not only that a
meaning conforming to the practice is possible, but that such an
interpretation is right, regardless' of what the legislature might
have intended:
[Action [taken by those regulated by a statute], manifestly, is
especially cogent evidence that the words of the statute would
bear the meaning which the action necessarily attributed to
them. Was it not also evidence that the meaning was not merely
possible but right-and this on a principle independent of any
assumed awareness of the popular understanding on the part of
the legislature? In the social institution of language, is not the
true meaning of words disclosed by the meaning which in fact
they have communicated?
167. HART & SACKS, supra note 112, at 1379-80. These authors provide a different
rationale in support of a court's reliance on previous judicial understanding of a statute:
The court's own prior interpretations of a statute in related applications should
be accepted, on the principle of stare decisis, unless they are manifestly out of
accord with other indications of purpose. Once these applications are treated as
fixed, they serve as points of reference for juristic thinking in the same fashion
as verbally clear applications in the case of a new statute.
Id. at 1379.
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An illustration of the point is afforded by the experience
which law professors, and no doubt other professors, almost
invariably have in drafting examination questions. The question
is written as carefully as the instructor knows how in order to
raise for discussion certain problems and those problems only.
Again and again, in reading answers the instructor will discover
that a problem which he did not see was actually posed in the
words he used, and that one or more problems which he thought
were posed, were not, or at least not successfully posed. He will
then alter his understanding of the question, for the purpose of
grading the answers, so as to make it correspond with the
meaning actually communicated rather than with the meaning
which originally he had subjectively "intended. "I"
A court's decision to credit the meaning of a statute as
determined by communis opinio also serves rule-of-law values.16
"The rule of law requires that statutes ... be applied in an objective,
consistent, and transparent way to citizens and others subject to
the state's authority."7 ° Such values are disserved by a judicial
decision rejecting a common practice that arguably fixes statutory
meaning.
A series of decisions interpreting various tariff acts in the second
half of the nineteenth century reflects the approach to identifying
statutory meaning advocated by Hart and Sacks,17" ' and illustrates
168. Id. at 1270. As the quoted passage indicates, Hart and Sacks viewed common practice
as so important to discerning the meaning of a statute because:
Language is a social institution. Its successful functioning depends upon
commonly, accepted responses to particular verbal symbols used in particular
kinds of contexts. These responses are social facts. A particular user of the
language may play tricks with it, and assign his own private meanings to
particular symbols in it. But he cannot unilaterally alter the social facts of other
people's responses. He can affect those risponses, if at all, only as people
generally come to understand and accept his own originally private meanings.
Id. at 1188; cf William Safire, What Language in the Year 3000?, N.Y. TIMS, Dec. 5, 1999,
§ 6 (Magazine), at 29 ("Language has no life independent of its speakers and does not change
according to laws of its own.").
169. The importance of employing the communis opinio canon to furthering rule-of-law
values is discussed in greater detail infra in Part III.D.l.
170. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Norms, Empiricism, and Canons in Statutory
Interpretation, 66 U. Cml. L. RsV. 671, 678 (1999).
171. See HART & SACKs, supra note 112, at 1268-69, where the authors stated:
Evidence of the common understanding of [statutory] terms ... might be
thought to be relevant for two reasons: first, as showing, at the least, that the
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how the Supreme Court has traditionally viewed common practice
as strong evidence of the meaning of statutory text. In Maillard v.
Lawrence,172 the Court considered a claim that worsted shawls
should not have been subjected to the tariff applicable to 'clothing
ready-made, and wearing apparel of every description, of whatever
material composed, made up, or manufactured, wholly or in part by
the tailor, sempstress, or manufacturer.' 173 The claimant tried to
show that the term "shawl" had a specialized meaning within the
commercial community that brought it outside the statutory
description. Responding to this contention, Attorney General
Cushing relied principally on common practice to support the
applicability of the tariff:
The witnesses for the plaintiffs... endeavor to confuse the plain
meaning of the statute by introducinga sophistical sense, called
by them "a commercial sense;" and even in that they put away
the established significations of words, contradict standard
writers on commerce, and repudiate common sense and common
usage.
Wearing apparel is a general description or genus compre-
hending many species, and shawls are undoubtedly a species of
wearing apparel. Common use, the definitions and explanations
of learned writers of commercial dictionaries, and of other
lexicons, the daily experience of our own eyesight, all concur to
convince our understandings, beyond a doubt, that shawls are
a species of apparel worn by females.1"
The Supreme Court rejected the appeal to special meaning,
concluding that "[tihe popular or received import of words
furnishes the general rule for the interpretation of public laws
as well as of private and social transactions."1 75 The Court's
reasoning foreshadowed substantially the idea of the "social
institution of language" elaborated by Hart and Sacks, as well as
words would bear the meaning reflected in the understanding; and, second, as
showing, on the basis of the assumption that the legislature used the words in
their ordinary signification to the people affected, that this meaning was the
correct one.
172. 57 U.S. (16 How.) 251 (1853).
173. Id. at 257 (quoting schedule C of the Tariff Act of 1846).
174. Id- at 255-56.
175. Id. at 261.
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the transparency concerns, implicit in its reference to the "safety"
of giving words their common meaning, that motivate the rule-of-
law rationale:
The effort has been to substitute for the literal and
lexicographical and popular meaning of the phrase "wearing
apparel," some supposed mercantile or commercial signification
of these words, and to render subservient to that signification
what was clearly accordant with the etymology of the language
of the statute, with the essential purposes and action of the
government, and with the wide-spread, if not the universal
understanding, of all who may not happen to fall within the
range of a limited and interested class. In instances in which
words or phrases are novel or obscure, as in terms of art, where
they are peculiar or exclusive in their signification, it may be
proper to explain or elicidate them by reference to the art or
science to which they are appropriate; but if language which is
familiar to all classes and grades and occupations-language,
the meaning of which is impressed upon all by the daily habits
and necessities of all, may be wrested from its established and
popular import in reference to the common concerns of life,
there can be little stability or safety in the regulations of society.
Perhaps within the compass of the English language, and
certainly within the popular comprehension of the inhabitants
of this country, there can scarcely be found terms the import of
which is better understood than is that of the words "shawl" and
"wearing apparel," or of "shawl" as a familiar, every day and
indispensable part of wearing apparel. And it would seem to be
a most extravagant supposition which could hold that, in the
enactment of a law affecting the interests of the nation at large,
the legislature should select for that purpose language by which
the nation or the mass of the people must necessarily be misled.
The popular or received import of words furnishes the general
rule for the interpretation of public laws as well as of private
and social transactions; and wherever the legislature adopts
such language in order to define and promulgate their action or
their will, the just conclusion from such a course must be, that
they not only themselves comprehended the meaning of the
language they have selected, but have chosen it with reference
to the known apprehension of those to whom the legislative
language is addressed, and for whom it is designed to constitute
a rule of conduct, namely, the community at large. If therefore
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the strange concession were admissible that, in the opinion of a
portion of the mercantile men, shawls were not considered
wearing apparel, it would still remain to be proved that this
opinion was sustained by the judgment of the community
generally, or that the legislature designed a departure from the
natural and popular acceptation of language. 76
The Court pursued the same interpretive approach in the more
famous tariff act case of Nix v. Hedden.77 There, the Court
concluded that tomatoes are "vegetables" and not "fruit" in
determiningthe applicable duty. The Court relied on the "[clommon
language of the people, whether sellers or consumers of provisions,"
regardless of the category that might apply "[blotanically
speaking."78 Similarly, in Robertson v. Salomon,'79 the Court
rejected a claim that white beans should be free of duty because
they are seeds "not otherwise provided for," rather than subject to
a duty often percent as "vegetables." 0° The Court specifically held
that evidence of common understanding of a product is admissible
in determining the statute's applicability:
The [trial] court, however, did not allow the [Customs Service]
to prove the common designation of beans as an article of food.
It was shown by the evidence that beans are generally sold and
dealt in, under the simple designation of "beans;" but that does
not solve the question as between the rival designations of
"seeds" and "vegetables." The common designation as used in
every-day life, when beans are used as food, (which is the great
purpose of their production,) would have been very proper to be
shown in the absence of further light from commercial usage.
We think that the evidence on this point ought to have been
admitted.'8 '
The Court also rejected giving a classification to beans that, while
technically accurate, was inconsistent with common practice: "We
do not see why [white beans] should be classified as seeds any more
176. Id.
177. 149 U.S. 304 (1893).
178. Id. at 307.
179. 130 U.S. 412 (1889).
180. Id. at 413.
181. Id. at 414-15.
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than walnuts should be so classified. Both are seeds in the language
of botany or natural history, but not in commerce nor in common
parlance."1"2 In all three cases, the Court viewed it as wholly proper
to discern statutory meaning on the basis of common practice.
In another of this series of cases, the Supreme Court identified
common practice as critical to defining when a term used in a tariff
statute will receive a specialized meaning. In De Forest v.
Lawrence,' the claimant had imported dried sheepskins with the
wool remaining on them and, because the trade designation for the
import was "skins," sought to have the five percent duty for "raw
hides and skins" applied to the import.' The Supreme Court held
instead that the common practice within customs and within the
course of tariff legislation determined the applicable tariff
designation for the import, notwithstanding the terms that might
be used in commercial dealing:
The article [of import] has never been classed in any of the tariff
acts under the designation of skins; but has been charged
always, since it came under the notice of these [tariffl acts, with
a specific duty. It has been thus charged, since the act of 1828,
down to the present act, a period of some eighteen years. And,
although it has been invoiced, and is known in trade and
commerce, by the designation of sheepskin raw, and dried, and
may, generally speaking, be properly ranged under the
donomination [sic] of skins, as a class; yet, having a known
designation in the revenue acts, distinct from the general class
to which it might otherwise be assigned, we must regard the
article in the light in which it is viewed by these acts, rather
than in trade and commerce. For, when Congress, in legislating
on the subject of duties, has described an article so as to identify
it by a given designation for revenue purposes, and this has
been so long continued as to impress on it a particular
designation as an article of import, then it must be treated as a
distinct article, whether there be evidence that it is so known in
commerce or not. It must be taken as thus known in the sense
of the revenue laws, by reason of the legal designation given to
182. Id. at 414.
183. 54 U.S. (13 How.) 274 (1851).
184. Id. at 280.
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it, and by which it has been known and practised on at the
custom-house.8 5
In sum, these tariff act cases demonstrate that the meaning of
statutory terms as set by the common practice may effectively de-
termine statutory meaning, notwithstanding dictionary meaning.186
Moreover, the relevant practice may be defined by a special group
or groups especially affected by a statute's provisions.1
7
We consider now how the two principal modern approaches to
statutory interpretation would evaluate this evidence of meaning.
At some point, even nonformalists must recognize the significance
of statutory text and accept that clear text may determine statutory
meaning. 8' A nonformalist judge may wish to employ communis
opinio as an especially effective check to decide whether the
statutory text is determinative. When the common practice shows
that the expected meaning of the words in the text has in fact been
accepted and acted upon by those affected by positive law,
nonformalists are almost certain to adhere to that interpretive
result. The rule of law in such cases is plain.89 When, however,
185. Id, at 281-82.
186. See G.A.ENDLICH, ACOMMENTARYONTHEINTERPRETATIONOFSTATUTES § 357(1888)
("[Tihe meaning publicly given by contemporary, or long professional usage, is presumed to
be the true one, even when the language has etymologically or popularly a different
meaning.").
187. Professor Popkin has written that Justice Stevens has a special interest in assessing
how legislative directives are understood by particular groups:
Justice Stevens also worries more than most judges about the problems raised
by deference to the plain meaning of language. He self-consciously focuses on
the common historical understanding of the words at the time the statute was
adopted. He worries about an often-neglected question arising from reliance on
the plain meaning- to what audience is the meaning plain.
Poplin, supra note 43, at 1148 (footnote omitted).
188. See, e.g., FrederickJ. De Sloovbre, Textual Interpretation of Statutes, 11 N.Y.U. L.Q.
REV. 538, 543 (1934) ("Thus a limited sphere of direct influence of the doctrine of literalness
is this: A sensible literal meaning of a statute must always be followed if there is no other
meaning that the words can reasonably bear.").
189. Compare Michaels, supra note 91, at 418, who writes:
The process of adjudication thus depends not on words which have plain
meanings and can be used as touchstones against which to measure words
whose meanings are not so plain. It depends instead on what Corbin calls
"undisputed contexts," agreement on the meaning of one piece of language
which can then compel agreement on the meaning of another. No text by itself
can enforce such an agreement, because a "text by itself" is no text at all.
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there is a communis opinio that is inconsistent with an arguably
clear meaning of the statutory text, a nonformalist may conclude
that the common practice has signaled that the text's meaning is
not plain and that a contextual meaning is warranted." °
Indeed, Brogan itself is a case in which two nonformalists found
the text so determinate in its meaning that they rejected Justice
Stevens's communis opinio argument and rejected the "exculpatory
no" doctrine, notwithstanding their stated public policy concerns
about the broad scope of the False Statements Act as construed
in Brogan. 9' These nonformalist Justices failed to find that the
practice under the statute was a sufficient signal that the inter-
pretive result should not be dictated by the determinate meaning
of the text.
In other contexts, nonformalists may decide that a legal text
must be interpreted contrary to a common practice, despite the fact
that the common practice arguably conforms to the text, because
other interpretive rules compel the contrary interpretation. For
example, the practice of separate but equal may have been common
following the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment and that
common practice may have been consistent with a meaning of the
legal text.192 There can be no doubt, however, that the Court
properly rejected that practice based on its understanding of the
190. Cf id. at 420 ("[Pilain meanings are functions not of texts, but of the situations in
which we read them.').
191. See Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398,408-18 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
Justice Souter joined Justice Ginsburg's opinion.
192. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537,550-51 (1896), in which the Court defended its
acceptance of the legality of separate but equal by describing its wide spread applicability.
So far, then, as a conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment is concerned, the
case reduces itself to the question whether the statute of Louisiana is a
reasonable regulation, and with respect to this there must necessarily be a
large discretion on the part of the legislature. In determining the question of
reasonableness it is at liberty to act with reference to the established usages,
customs and traditions of the people, and with a view to the promotion of their
comfort, and the preservation of the public peace and good order. Gauged by
this standard, we cannot say that a law which authorizes or even requires the
separation of the two races in public conveyances is unreasonable, or more
obnoxious to the Fourteenth Amendment than the acts of Congress requiring
separate schools for colored children in the District of Columbia, the
constitutionality of which does not seem to have been questioned, or the
corresponding acts of state legislatures.
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equality principle established by the Fourteenth Amendment.19
In short, communis opinio should be an important, but not
determinative, canon for nonformalists.
Communis opinio should be no less important to a formalist's
interpretation of statutory text. Formalists would no doubt accept
that, when the arguably clear meaning of statutory text is
confirmed by a consistent common practice, the statute's meaning
is fixed. It is, however, when communis opinio conflicts with the
court's view of plain meaning that a formalist ought to employ the
canon as a critical check on the autonomy of their interpretive
method. 9' Putting aside constitutional issues of presentment and
bicameralism,195 formalists place such high value on the legal text
because they value an autonomous interpretive regime that limits
extratextual sources and opportunities for judges to impose their
own ideological views through the interpretation of statutes.1 96
193. InBrown v. Board ofEducation, 347 U.S. 483,493 (1954), the Court framed the issue
as follows: "We come then to the question presented: Does segregation of children in public
schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other tangible'
factors may be equal, deprive the children of the minority group of equal educational
opportunities? We believe that it does." Although the Court had received substantial evidence
about the history of racial segregation around the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment, id. at 489, the Court abjured reliance on such evidence:
In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the
Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 whenPlessy v. Ferguson was written.
We must consider public education in the light of its full development and its
present place in American life throughout the Nation. Only in this way can it
be determined if segregation in public schools deprives these plaintiffs of the
equal protection of the laws.
Id. at 492-93.
194. Compare SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 187, who has written that:
Dictionary definitions can be too numerous or too crude to capture contextual
meaning. (Consider the words "bat," "equal," and "motor vehicle.") But courts
should use the ordinary understandings of speakers of the relevant language.
This approach promotes planning and imposes good incentives on legislators,
by encouraging them to write in the way that people read. It also serves an
important coordinating function, by allowing judges, who are not specialists, to
start from common ground.
195. Seegenerally Manning, supra note 91 (analyzingthe extentto whichthe Constitution
requires a formalist interpretive method).
196. See Sunstein, supra note 2, at 638-39; see also Michaels, supra note 91, at 411
("[Formalism in contract interpretation was] an attempt to guarantee the objectivity of the
contract by ensuring that both parties would be bound to what the words themselves said
and not to anyone's 'subjective' or 'private' interpretation of what the words meant.").
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A characteristic typically associated with the autonomy of
formalism is inflexibility-a resistance to change.197 One important
context in which the inflexibility of formalism is apparent is that
method's rejection of equity.9 A classic statement of this formalist
rejection of equity was presented by Blackstone, who praised the
autonomy of law. 99
197. See Guido Calabresi, Two Functions of Formalism: In Memory of Guido Tedeschi, 67
U. Cm. L. REv. 479,482 (2000) ("[A] formal, self-contained, uncriticizable system oflaw is
conservative. It can't be changed.").
198. See Sunstein, supra note 2, at 639 ("[Flormalism stands opposed to 'equity,' in the
form of a willingness to extend or limit the reach of the applicable text... ."). To illustrate
the inflexibility of formalism, Judge Calabresi contrasted that approach with a functional
interpretation, which was quite rare in the Middle Ages:
For instance, in the Middle Ages in Italy, in Bologna, someone passed a law
against shedding blood in the streets. The object of the law, I guess, was
dueling, roughhousing, that kind of thing. It happened one day that a man was
walking down the streets of Bologna and collapsed. He was sick; a doctor came
along and, according to accepted medical practice, bled him, thus shedding
blood in the streets. A policeman, seeing that the law as written was broken,
arrested the doctor and brought him before ajudge. The judge said what seems
perfectly normal to us today, "that wasn't what the law was about. He did shed
blood in the streets, but it had nothing to do with why the law was passed." And
he let the doctor go. That is a typical example of a functional approach to law.
The court looked not at the language of the law, but only to what the law was
supposed to do. At that time in most other countries, such an approach would
not have been thought of.
Calabresi, supra note 197, at 481.
199. See 1 WILLTAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIE *62, where Blackstone wrote:
Equity thus depending, essentially, upon the particular circumstances of each
individual case, there can be no established rules and fixed precepts of equity
laid down, without destroying its very essence, and reducing it to a positive law.
And, on the other hand, the liberty ofconsidering all cases in an equitable light
must not be indulged too far, lest thereby we destroy all law, and leave the
decision of every question entirely in the breast of the judge. And law without
equity, though hard and disagreeable, is much more desirable for the public
good, than equity without law; which would make everyjudge a legislator, and
introduce most infinite confusion; as there would then be almost as many
different rules of action laid down in our courts, as there are differences of
capacity and sentiment in the human mind.
Judge Calabresi has written about the attraction of formalism in similar terms:
[TMhe fear that any law that responded to social ends, even if now the social
ends were democratic, might in the future be corruptible to bad social ends,
continued to have an influence. In a way, these people said, it is better to have
a legal system that cannot change, than to put it in the hands of human beings
who are fallible.
Calabresi, supra note 197, at 483.
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Given this commitment to autonomy, Justice Scalia's complete
rejection of the communis opinio canon inBrogan can be understood
as a means of limiting a court's ability to look outside the statutory
text and to assign an unacceptable meaning to its words. Such a
view of the canon is, however, deeply flawed. Unlike other canons
or interpretive methods that a formalist may reject because they
allow judges to impose their own substantive values under the guise
of interpretation,0 0 communis opinio must be defined indepen-
dently of the substantive views of the interpreting judge and,
accordingly, would not be easily subject to substantive distortion.2 1
Indeed, communis opinio reinforces common practice by holding
that a court may overrule such practice only for the strongest
of reasons, which should exclude formalist interpretations that
unpredictably make words bear the weight of too specific a
meaning.20
2
200. See Sunstein, supra note 2, at 653 who indicates:
In their modem incarnation, formalist approaches to interpretation tend to
share a number of positive and negative features: ... [including] attention to
canons of construction that help in limiting judicial discretion and in
uncovering meaning, and also to canons that reflect a distinct constitutional
commitment or otherwise give clear signals to Congress, but not to canons of
interpretation that are not time-honored or that embody controversial
judgments about public policy.
201. I say "easily" because a formalist might reply that judges may employ communis
opinio in support of their own policyviews by determining that a supportive common practice
is present when there is no such common practice. Compare Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 120
(2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (finding an "established practice" in Florida elections
law), with supra note 29 (strongly disputing existence of any reliable practice in Florida
elections law).
202. As Professor Eskridge asserts:
An independent judiciary maymake it more likely that a statute will be applied
in the same way tomorrow as today, and to the powerful and influential as well
as to the miserable and the obscure, but an independent judiciary also poses a
risk that judges will bend statutes to reflect their own political preferences. The
latter would undermine our ability to predict how a statute will be applied, and
the cynical among us expect that judicial bending would be slanted in favor of
persons or groups the judge identifies with or likes.
Eskridge, supra note 170, at 678.
Compare this view, however, with that of an earlier commentator.
Where courts were once considered purely as common law tribunals, the
enormous increase in statutory material has changed the actual function of
courts of law to approximate more closely the civil law ideal of courts as
agencies for the application and administration of the legislative precept. Law
is no longer the sacred precept of the court but the common property of the
masses. It is the expression of what they believe to be their will and it is not for
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The formalism of Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas as well,
however, gives words a meaning grounded in dictionary meaning °3
and etymology, 0 4 rather than usage,20 5 and yields an interpretive
approach that appears curiously inattentive to and unconcerned
with the real world actions of those affected by legislation. Holder
v. Hall2°6 provides a striking example of how Justice Scalia's
formalism ignores grounded contextual meaning. In that case,
Justice Scalia joined a concurring opinion written by Justice
Thomas that interpreted the words, "standard, practice, or
procedure," included in section 2 of the Voting Rights Act2 7 as
"refer[ing] only to practices that affect minority citizens' access to
the ballot."20M These Justices supported their interpretation by a
consideration of the entire text of section 2,209 an application of the
ejusdem generis canon,210 and a clear statement rule21 1-the last
refuge of the formalist faced with a broad text.212 Three dissenting
Justices rejected this formalist interpretation, partly because it
conflicted with common practice: a "consistent and expansive
interpretation of the Act by this Court, Congress, and the Attorney
General."213 In his dissent, Justice Stevens characterized Justice
Thomas's formalist interpretation as a "radical reinterpretation of
the Voting Rights Act."214 Indeed, the proposed reinterpretation was
the courts to frustrate it because of too nice legalistic conceptions of law and
government.
Frank E. Horack, Jr., In the Name of Legislative Intention, 38 W. VA. L.Q. 119, 124 (1932)
(footnote omitted).
203. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 719
(1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (relying on dictionary meaning of "harm"); see also Johnsonv.
United States, 529 U.S. 694,705 n.7 (2000) (characterizing Justice Scalia's formalist reading
of text as "virtuoso lexicography, but it shows only that English is rich enough to give even
textualists room for creative readings").
204. See MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 225-28 (1994)
(relying on the etymology of the word "modify" to hold a regulation of the Federal
Communications Commission unlawful).
205. But cf infra note 215.
206. 512 U.S. 874 (1994).
207. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
208. Holder, 512 U.S. at 914 (Thomas, J., concurring).
209. Id. at 914-16.
210. Id. at 917-18.
211. Id. at 922.
212. See supra notes 157-61 and accompanying text.
213. Holder, 512 U.S. at 950 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
214. Id. at 965 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
594
INTERPRETING LAW OR CHANGING LAW
radical because, by taking no account of the understanding that had
developed about the meaning of the statutory terms, the formalists
were urging a fundamental change in the shape of federal voting
rights law-inattention to communis opinio would have resulted in
an ungrounded meaning of statutory text and a radical, unpredicted
change in the law. 215
Justice Scalia's rejection of a contextual understanding of the
meaning of words in favor of an intrinsic and ideal meaning appears
analogous to one side in the debate about the role of a dictionary in
the English language.2 ' Leading English writers and intellectuals
in the eighteenth century had hoped that the first comprehensive
dictionary would capture the timeless essence of the words of the
English language and, similar to the French Academy, preserve and
define a "national standard language."2' 7 The first great English
dictionary, completed by Samuel Johnson in 1755, did not, however,
fulfill these hopes: "The consensus now is that [Johnson] originally
planned to make a fix on the tongue, but when he was halfway
through his six-year task, he came to realize that it was both
impossible and undesirable."21 Moreover, the greatest of English
dictionaries, the Oxford English Dictionary, was developed on a
principle contrary to that embraced by Justice Scalia, namely that
meaning is not abstract and intrinsic, but is dependent on context
215. Justice Scalia would likely objectto this characterization ofhis formalism as abstract
and unconnected to usage. In a recent decision, Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694
(2000), the Court's debate about interpretive methodology focused on the meaning of the
word "revoke" in the federal statute governing sentencing-18 U.S.C. § 3583(eX3) (Supp. V
1993). The nonformalist majority opinion gave what the majority viewed as a ess common,"
though not "rare or obsolete," meaning to that word, because 'the ordinary meaning fails to
fit the text and... the realization of clear congressional policy... is in tension with the result
that customary interpretive rules would deliver." Johnson, 529 U.S. at 706 n.9. Justice
Scalia's formalist dissent relied on the ordinarymeaningof the term revealed by dictionaries,
subjected to "the acid test of whether a word can reasonably bear a particular meaning[, that
is,] whether you could use the word in that sense at a cocktail party without having people
look at you funny." Id. at 718 (Scalia, J., dissenting). He concluded that "[tihe Court's
assigned meaning would surely fail that test, even late in the evening." Id. To the extent,
however, that a common practice arose pursuant to particular statutory text, giving the text
the meaning assigned by the practice would presumably pass the cocktail party test.
216. See SIMON WINCHESTER, TEE PROFESSOR AND THE MADMAN: A TALE OF MURDER,
INSANITY, AND THE MAKING OF THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 89-99 (1998), in which the
author presents a brief history of Samuel Johnson's A Dictionary of the English Language,
which was published in 1755.
217. See id. at 91.
218. Id. at 92.
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and usage.219 Freed from context and usage, the formalist method
loses all claim to objectivity and instead turns on the judge's own
rarefied and subjective view of the meaning of particular words.
If formalists such as Justices Scalia and Thomas were, however,
to employ the communis opinio canon, they would go a long way
toward ensuring that their method's autonomy does not unsettle
the legal foundation in an unpredictable manner.221 Such a
constraint on what Judge Calabresi has described as the "gold
219. Id. at 25-26:
The OED's guiding principle, the one that has set it apart from most other
dictionaries, is its rigorous dependence on gathering quotations from published
or otherwise recorded uses of English and using them to illustrate the use ofthe
sense of every single word in the language. The reason behind this unusual and
tremendously labor-intensive style of editing and compiling was both bold and
simple: By gathering and publishing selected quotations, the dictionary could
demonstrate the full range ofcharacteristics ofeach and every word with a very
great degree of precision. Quotations could show exactly how a word has been
employed over the centuries; how it has undergone subtle changes of shades of
meaning, or spelling, or pronunciation; and, perhaps most important ofall, how
and more exactly when each word slipped into the language in the first place.
No other means of dictionary compilation could do such a thing: Only by finding
and showing examples could the full range of a word's past possibilities be
explored.
220. Compare Hotchkiss v. National City Bank, 200 F. 287,293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), in which
Judge Hand stated:
A contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the personal, or individual,
intent of the parties. A contract is an obligation attached by the mere force of
law to certain acts of the parties, usually words, which ordinarily accompany
and represent a known intent. If, however, it were proved by twenty bishops
that either party, when he used the words, intended something else than the
usual meaning which the law imposes upon them, he would still be held, unless
there were some mutual mistake, or something else of the sort.
221. The unsettling impact of an unpredicted interpretation of a statute follows from its
broad consequences. See Frank E. Horack Jr., The Disintegration of Statutory Construction,
24 IND. L.J. 335, 347 (1949), who wrote:
Statutory construction has more than judicial consequences. Obviously, every
judicial decision has effect beyond the immediate litigants involved. Lawyers
advise clients on the basis of court decisions. Transactions are entered into on
the assumption that former decisions in the same field will have future
application. Decisions founded on statutory interpretation have wide import.
Not only do they serve as a guide for future litigation and counseling, but they
become guides for future statutory drafting, both in the area of the decision,
and in many other fields as well.
The final part of this Article will discuss the decision and error costs that are likely if courts
ignore communis opinio when interpreting statutes. See infra Part IH.D.2.
596
2001] INTERPRETING LAW OR CHANGING LAW 597
standard" characteristic of legal formalism 222 should be accepted
by formalists as a particularly effective means for ensuring
that observers will not judge formalist interpretations as
"hypertextual."' Moreover, by employing the communis opinio
canon, all courts, especially those employing the formalist
interpretive method, can better ensure a legal system in which
courts act as participants in the effective development of law.' A
222. See Calabresi, supra note 197, at 483, in which Judge Calabresi stated:
The greatest inflations and depressions in the world's history have been under
the gold standard due to the rise and fall of the supply of gold, which was
essentially outsidehuman control. I suppose those who like a formalistic system
of law believe that there is less danger from something that is not within
human control than from something that can be made to do what human beings
want. Because sometimes, what human beings want might be Fascism.
For example, a formalistic method could lead a court to apply a law intended to prevent
dueling in the streets to prohibit medical treatment to an injured person, if the treatment
involved loss of blood. See supra note 198. The problems with such a "gold standard" are
obvious.
223. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court's New Hypertextualism: AnInvitation
to Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 778
(1995). In addition, Professors Eskridge and Frickey have written:
[Tihe new, tougher version of textualism advocated by Justices Scalia and
Thomas exacerbates the tension between democracy and the rule of law and
ultimately serves as a cover for the injection of conservative values into
statutes. Insisting that statutory interpretation ignore legislative history and
adhering to dictionaries at the expense of common sense, the new textualism
is insensitive to the expectations of elected representatives. Maintaining that
clear statutory texts can trump longstanding practice and taking a dogmatic
and often bizarre view of what is clear, the new textualism sacrifices the
security and predictability associated with the rule of law.
Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 129, at 77 (footnote omitted).
224. See HART& SACKS, supra note 112, at 1309 ("[IThe most important criterion is simply
consistency with all the rest of the law.... though Justice has higher aims, the virtue on
which the Law stakes its hopes of salvation is consistency. But, as I say, this answer falls
back on general jurisprudence, all the rest of the law.") (quoting Charles B. Curtis, A Better
Theory of Legal Interpretation, 3 VAND. L. REV. 407, 423 (1950)); JAMES WILLARD HURST,
DEALING WITH STATUTES 46 (1982) ("The statutory text is basic and central. But... to be a
vital force in society, the text usually must be seen as part of a flow of policy-making activity
that originates before the text is voted and continues after it is on the books."). Compare this
with Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 125, at 87, who indicate:
If the Court both creates a coherent interpretive regime... and then applies it
with some constancy, then the Court has not only served a core function of the
judiciary but has also revealed its usefulness to the political branches. In that
event, the Court can enhance its credibility when it does have a well-considered
constitutional objection to a course of action undertaken by the political
branches.
This law-development value of communis opinio is addressed in the last section of the
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failure to account properly for communis opinio greatly increases
the risk that the formalist method is being used by judges, under
the guise of autonomy, to unsettle the law in an apparently
willful 2 '5 and likely erroneous 211 manner.
In sum, a very strong rationale for relying on communis opinio in
the interpretation of statutory texts is that common practice
provides very persuasive evidence of the meaning of the text. To the
extent that formalism as an interpretive method fails to value such
evidence, formalism is more likely to yield interpretive results that
reshape the law in fundamental ways and is not credible in its
claim to be an objective method of interpretation.
B. Legislative Intent
A second rationale for the use of communis opinio when
determining the meaning of written law, either statutory or
constitutional, is that common practice indicates the intent of the
drafters of the law. This rationale has been employed most
commonly when the Court has relied upon the common practice of
early Congresses to discern the meaning of constitutional
Article. See infra Part III.D.
225. See Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874 (1994) (discussed supra notes 206-15).
226. Courts are likely to err when they reject common practice and impose their own view
of a proper legal rule. See Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation, Empiricism, and the Closure
Problem, 66 U. Cml. L. REV. 698, 707 (1999) ("Both rational choice and Burkean approaches
suggest that deference to a developed consensus is often a sensible move for actors who
themselves lack the information necessary for decisionmaking; moreover, consensus reduces
the variance of opinions and thus dampens the effect of extreme views."). Courts should be
especially wary about overruling the common practice when it is developed through agency
expertise:
[A]gencies are better informed, more efficient barometers of the political
equilibrium than the Court is. Because of their place in governance, agencies
are both knowledgeable about and responsive to presidential and congressional
preferences. Agencies are also the first government organ to address most
interpretive issues, and when they do so they are usually able to anticipate the
responses of other national institutions accurately enough to avoid overrides.
Knowing that an agency is likely to have much better information than the
Court does, the Court will rationally defer to the agency on most issues. Not
deferring carries with it an increased risk of a political rebuke.
Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 129, at 71-72 (footnote omitted). Cf Christensen v. Harris
County, 529 U.S. 576, 597 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("If statutes are to serve the human
purposes that called them into being, courts will have to continue to pay particular attention
in appropriate cases to the experienced-based views of expert agencies.").
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provisions. Indeed, when the Court decided Stuart v. Laird227
and first employed the communis opinio canon, the context was
an interpretation of the Constitution. The Court relied on the
common understanding of the Constitution, "commencing with the
organization of the judicial system," to reject the claim that it was
unconstitutional for members ofthe Supreme Court "to sit as circuit
judges, not being appointed as such."2"
Almost one hundred years after Laird, the Court persistently
relied upon communis opinio in Knowlton v. Moore2 29 to counter a
series of claims that Congress had violated the Constitution when
it established a progressive estate tax. The first claim of uncon-
stitutionality:
[Rlest[ed] upon the assumption that, since the transmission of
property by death is exclusively subject to the regulating
authority of the several States, therefore the levy by Congress
of a tax on inheritances or legacies, in any form, is beyond the
power of Congress, and is an interference by the National
Government with a matter which falls alone within the reach of
state legislation.20
In rejecting this claim, the Court began with a communis opinio
argument that carried "great weight":
It is to be remarked that this proposition denies to Congress the
right to tax a subject-matter which was conceded to be within
the scope of its power very early in the history of the
government. The act of 1797, which ordained legacy taxes, was
adopted at a time when the founders of our government and
framers of our Constitution were actively participating in public
affairs, thus giving a practical construction to the Constitution
which they had helped to establish. Even the then members of
the Congress who had not been delegates to the convention
which framed the Constitution, must have had a keen appreci-
ation of the influences which had shaped the Constitution and
the restrictions which it embodied, since all questions which
227. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803).
228. Id. at 309.
229. 178 U.S. 41 (1900).
230. Id. at 56.
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related to the Constitution and its adoption must have been, at
that early date, vividly impressed on their minds. It would,
under these conditions, be indeed surprising ifa tax should have
been levied without question upon objects deemed to be beyond
the grasp of Congress because exclusively within state
authority. It is, moreover, worthy of remark that similar taxes
have at other periods and for a considerable time been enforced;
and, although their constitutionalty [sic] was assailed on other
grounds held unsound by this court, the question of the want of
authority of Congress to levy a tax on inheritances and legacies
was never urged against the acts in question. Whilst these
considerations are of great weight, let us for the moment put
them aside to consider the reasoning upon which the proposition
denying the power in Congress to impose death duties must
rest.2
s1
After comprehensively rejecting the claim that an inheritance tax
was beyond the power of Congress, the Court turned to the claim
that the inheritance tax was unconstitutional because it violated
the Constitution's requirement that "all Duties, Imposts and
Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States." 2 Again,
the Court rejected the claim of unconstitutionality by relying first
on communis opinio:
[Olne of the most satisfactory answers to the argument that the
uniformity required by the Constitution is the same as the equal
and uniform clause which has since been embodied in so many
of the state constitutions, results from a review of the practice
under the Constitution from the beginning. From the very first
Congress down to the present date, in laying duties, imposts and
excises, the rule of inherent uniformity, or, in other words,
intrinsically equal and uniform taxes, has been disregarded, and
the principle of geographical uniformity consistently enforced.
Take, for a general example, specific import duties, by which
particular specific rates are imposed on enumerated articles,
without reference to their value. It is manifest that all such
duties are void, if intrinsic equality and uniformity be the rule,
and yet in all the great controversies which have arisen over the
policy of impost duties generally, and particularly as to the
231. Id. at 56-57.
232. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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economic wisdom of specific duties, never has it been contended
that the power to impose them did not exist because of the
uniformity clause of the Constitution. 3
In rejecting the constitutional challenge, the Court found the
practice contemporaneous with the adoption of the Constitution to
be most important in discerning the meaning of the text:
Nor can it be said that these illustrations relate to legislation
enacted long after the adoption of the Constitution, when by
lapse of time an erroneous conception as to the meaning of the
Constitution had arisen, for the examples to which we have just
referred are but types of many forms of taxation by way of
duties, imposts and excises which were enacted without
question from the very beginning, and have continued in an
unbroken line to the present time, sanctioned by the founders of
our institutions and approved in practical execution by all the
illustrious men who have directed the public destinies of the
nation. Excise taxes were largely used during the
administration of President Washington, and again during and
after the war of 1812. It may properly be said of these excises
that none of them were uniform according to the principles now
contended for, yet no constitutional question in this regard was
ever raised about them.'
233. Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 92-93.
234. Id. at 93-94. Two other cases decided near the time of Knowlton are notable for their
reliance on common practice when interpreting the Constitution's text. In McPherson v.
Blacker, 146 U.S. 1 (1892), the Court considered a challenge to the method by which
Presidential electors were selected by states. The Court concluded:
The question before us is not one of policy but of power, and while public
opinion had gradually brought all the States as matter of fact to the pursuit of
a uniform system of popular election by general ticket, that fact does not tend
to weaken the force of contemporaneous and long continued previous practice
when and as different views of expediency prevailed. The prescription of the
written law cannot be overthrown because the States have latterly [sic]
exercised in a particular way a power which they might have exercised in some
other way. The construction to which we have referred has prevailed too long
and been too uniform to justify us in interpreting the language of the
Constitution as conveying any other meaning than thatheretofore ascribed, and
it must be treated as decisive.
Id. at 35-36.
Later, in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), the Court relied upon a detailed
discussion of the treatment of Congress's removal powers immediately after the ratification
of the Constitution, see id. at 111-26, to strike down as unconstitutional a statutory
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The Supreme Court's long-standing reliance on contemporary
practice to discern the meaning of constitutional text has continued
into a new century in a decision by Justice Scalia holding that
private parties have standing to bring qui tam actions. 5 To be
sure, Justice Scalia did not state expressly that he was relying on
either the communis opinio or contemporanea expositio canons.
Nevertheless, in deciding whether private claimants have standing
to raise an Article III case or controversy in a qui tam action,
Justice Scalia looked to American practice at the time of the
Constitution's framing and viewed that practice as "well nigh
conclusive":
Qui tam actions appear to have been as prevalent in America
as in England, at least in the period immediately before and
after the framing of the Constitution. Although there is no
evidence that the Colonies allowed common-law qui tam actions
(which, as we have noted, were dying out in England by that
time), they did pass several informer statutes expressly
authorizing qui tam suits.... Moreover, immediately after the
framing, the First Congress enacted a considerable number of
informer statutes. Like their English counterparts, some of them
provided both a bounty and an express cause of action; others
provided a bounty only.
We think this history well nigh conclusive with respect to the
question before us here: whether qui tam actions were cases and
controversies of the sort traditionally amenable to, and resolved
by, the judicial process."5
requirement that the Senate consent to the President's removal of a postmaster. See also
Fairbank v. United States, 181 U.S. 283, 322-23 (1901) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (discussing
the weight accorded to common practice).
235. Vermont Agency of Natural Res. v. United States, 529 U.S. 765 (2000).
236. Id. at 776-77 (citations, internal quotations, and footnotes omitted); see also id. at 788
(Ginsburg, J., concurring) ("IRjestriction of the judicial power to 'Cases' and 'Controversies'
is properly understood to mean 'cases and controversies of the sort traditionally amenable
to .... the judicial process.'... [Hlistory's pages place the qui tam suit safely within the 'case'
or'controversy' category.") (citations omitted); cf United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,
622 (2000) ("he force of the doctrine of stare decisis behind these decisions [interpreting the
Fourteenth Amendment] stems... from the insight attributable to the Members ofthe Court
at that time. Every Member... obviously had intimate knowledge and familiarity with the
events surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
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In all these constitutional cases, the significance of the common
practice of early Congresses is that those legislators, including
individuals who themselves had drafted the Constitution, best
understood the intent of the drafters of the Constitution. This
rationale is extended in other Supreme Court decisions to agency
practices, because in cases where the agency helped draft the
statute, the practices indicate what the agency intended by the
statutory text it drafted for legislative action. 7
The Court has also relied upon another form of the legislative-
intent rationale in some decisions looking to common practice in
discerning a statute's meaning. In these cases, the Court has
concluded that Congress's acceptance of the common practice means
that the statute must have been intended to permit that practice or
the statute would have been amended." 8 This is of course a version
237. See Blansetv. Cardin, 256 U.S. 319,326 (1921) ("T]here can be no doubtthat the act
was the suggestion of the Interior Department, and its construction is an assistant, if not
demonstrative criterion, of the meaning and purpose of the act.") (citations omitted); United
States v. Moore, 95 U.S. 760, 763 (1877) ("The construction given to a statute by those
charged with the duty of executing it is always entitled to the most respectful consideration,
and ought not to be overruled without cogent reasons. Not unfrequently they are the
draftsmen of the laws they are afterwards called upon to interpret.") (citations omitted); see
also Harry Willmer Jones, Statutory Doubts and Legislative Intention, 40 COLUM. L. REV.
957, 970 n.46 (1940) ("Perhaps the established doctrine that weight is to be given to
administrative or 'practical' construction in the judicial interpretation of statutes is, in some
degree, due to judicial recognition of administrative participation in the law-making
process.") (citation omitted).
238. See United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459,472-73 (1915) ("Both officers, law-
makers and citizens naturally adjust themselves to any long-continued action of the
Executive Department-on the presumption that unauthorized acts would not have been
allowed to be so often repeated as to crystallize into a regular practice."); Robertson v.
Downing, 127 U.S. 607, 613 (1888) ("Tis construction of the department has been followed
for many years, without any attempt of Congress to change it .... [Wihen there has been a
long acquiescence in a regulation, and by it rights of parties for many years have been
determined and adjusted, it is not to be disregarded without the most cogent and persuasive
reasons.") (citations omitted); United States v. The Reindeer, 27 F. Cas. 758, 762 (C.C.D.R.I.
1848) (No. 16,145) ("[A] construction so long and publicly prevailing, ... and without any
dissent by the treasury department, ... operates strongly in its support .... And it is fortified
even by the silence of congress [sic] itself, not legislating more specifically to prevent it, when
knowing, as it must, the views which its own officers and the community had taken of the
proper construction of the existing laws.") (citations omitted).
In one case, the Supreme Court relied specifically on Congress's oversight activities when
it applied the rationale of congressional acquiescence in a common practice:
We see no reason why we should not accord to the Commission's interpretation
of its own regulation and governing statute that respect which is customarily
given to a practical administrative construction of a disputed provision.
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of the congressional acquiesence argument-an argument that has
been derided as contrary to the practice of lawmaking by both
commentators and members of the Court.s 9 As a method of
inferring congressional intent, this interpretive method also
confuses the Congress whose intent is relevant to resolving the
interpretive issue, because the relevant acquiescence is by
Congresses subsequent to the enacting legislature.
The Court has employed the communis opinio canon in a related,
but less controversial, context when Congress has amended a
statute in some respects but has otherwise not acted to amend a
known, common practice.2'0 In this context, unlike the mere
acquiescence situation, Congress affirmatively enacts legislation
retaining the common practice and concerns about reliance on
inaction are accordingly less weighty.241
Particularly is this respect due when the administrative practice at stake
involves a contemporaneous construction of a statute by the men charged with
the responsibility of setting its machinery in motion, of making the parts work
efficiently and smoothly while they are yet untried and new. And finally, and
perhaps demanding particular weight, this construction has time and again
been brought to the attention of the Joint Committee of Congress on Atomic
Energy, which under § 202 of the Act, 42 U. S. C. § 2252, has a special duty
during each session of Congress to conduct hearings in either open or executive
session for the purpose of receiving information concerning the development,
growth, and state of the atomic energy industry, and to oversee the operations
of the AEC.
Power Reactor Dev. Co. v. International Union of Electricians, 367 U.S. 396, 408 (1961)
(citations and internal quotations omitted).
239. Citations to scholarly and judicial criticism of the judicial practice of inferring
legislative intent from legislative inaction are included in ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note
1, at 826-27.
240. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). The Court stated:
mhe Congress has not just kept its silence by refusing to overturn the
administrative construction, but has ratified it with positive legislation. Thirty
years of consistent administrative construction left undisturbed by Congress
until 1959, when that construction was expressly accepted, reinforce the
natural conclusion that the public interest language of the Act authorized the
Commission to require licensees to use their stations for discussion of public
issues ....
Id. at 381-82 (footnotes omitted). Accord Swigart v. Baker, 229 U.S. 187, 197-98 (1913);
United States v. G. Falk & Brother, 204 U.S. 143,152 (1907); United States v. Philbrick, 120
U.S. 52, 58-59 (1887).
241. Professors Eskridge and Frickey have written:
If Congress reenacts a statute without making any material changes in its
wording, the Court will often presume that Congress intends to incorporate
authoritative agency and judicial interpretations of that language into the
604
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In sum, the Supreme Court has often relied upon communis
opinio to interpret written law, on the theory that the common
practice shows the intent of the drafters of the law. Although
common, this rationale for the use of communis opinio, at least
when grounded on legislative acquiescence alone, is weak and
controversial.
C. Public Reliance
Courts have consistently articulated a third rationale for
applying the communis opinio canon: the reliance of the public on
accepted practice. When Chief Justice Marshall applied the canon
to adopt an interpretation of a statute that was contrary to its clear,
nonabsurd meaning, he was motivated by public reliance on the
accepted practice: "[Iun construing the statutes of a state on which
land titles depend, infinite mischief would ensue, should this court
observe a different rule from that which has been long established
in the state."242
When Justice Story employed the canon, he too believed that its
use was appropriate because of public reliance on the common
practice. In United States v. State Bank of North Carolina,24
Justice Story construed a statutory text that fixed the priority of
the United States to the assets of a debtor and decided that the
"universal practice" and "received construction will induce the
Court to hesitate before it will adopt another; as it would open those
long-established settlements, and would be productive of great
difficulty and confusion."2'
reenacted statute. The leading Supreme Court statement of this rule is found
in Lorillard v. Pons. .. , which stated: "Congress is presumed to be aware of an
administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt that
interpretation when it reenacts a statute without change."
ESKREDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 1, at 814 (quoting Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580
(1978)).
242. M'Keen v. Delancy's Lessee, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 22, 32 (1809); see id at 33 ("On this
evidence the court yields the construction which would be put on the words ofthe act, to that
which the courts of the state have put on it, and on which many titles may probably
depend."); see also M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,401 (1819) ("An exposition
of the constitution, deliberately established by legislative acts, on the faith of which an
immense property has been advanced, ought not to be lightly disregarded.").
243. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 29 (1832).
244. Id. at 30; see also id. at 39-40.
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In Schell's Executors v. Fauche,2' the Court considered the
statutory sufficiency of a protest against the payment of duties.
Considering only the terms of the statute, the Court concluded that:
[So far as respects the manner, or the person upon whom
protest shall be served, the statute is silent, and we can only
infer that from the nature of the proceedings it must be served
upon the collector or his subordinate officer, or the person who
receives the entry or the payment of the duties. In this silence
of the statute, and in the absence of any treasury regulation
upon the subject, it would probably be competent for the
collector to receive such protest personally, or delegate his
authority to one of his deputies.2'
Notwithstanding the statute's silence, the Court had to consider
two other competing views of the statute's requirements for
protesting duties. First, there was a previous Supreme Court
decision, "generally accepted as settling the law for this court, and
the practice has grown up throughout the country of paying duties
under such protests,-a practice to which eminent judges have lent
their sanction."247 Second, the Treasury Department had issued a
regulation-No. 384-prescribing procedures for protests different
than the common practice, procedures with which the protester
before the Court had failed to comply.24 The Court applied
communis opinio, focusing particularly on the public's reliance on
the common practice, to hold that failure to comply with the
Treasury regulation did not foreclose the protest:
[We think it too late for us to be called upon to overrule [the
common practice]. It is an acknowledged principle of law, that
if rights have been acquired under ajudicial interpretation of a
statute which has been acquiesced in by the public, such rights
ought not to be impaired or disturbed by a different construc-
tion, and if, notwithstanding Treasury Regulation Number 384,
requiring protests to be special in each case, a practice has
grown up in the different ports of entry of receiving prospective
245. 138 U.s. 562 (1891).
246. Id at 565.
247. Id. at 572.
248. See id.
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protests, the annulment of such practice might entail serious
consequences upon importers who had acted upon the faith of its
validity.... In all cases of ambiguity, the contemporaneous
construction, not only of the courts but of the departments, and
even of the officials whose duty it is to carry the law into effect,
is universally held to be controlling. 9
Courts have relied on the public-reliance rationale in many other
cases."0 One such case illustrates that the public-reliance rationale
is applicable when a court must decide the scope of criminal
liability defined by statute. This was, of course, the context of the
Supreme Court's recent formalist decision in Brogan."1 Similarly,
in United States v. The Reindeer, 2 the court stated that the
defendants
appeal strongly to the court in favor of a liberal construction to
protect a confiding class of people, who, in this case, did the acts
complained of under the sanction, if not advice of the officers of
government themselves, that had the execution of this branch
of the laws in their charge, and who did these acts in conformity
to a custom construing these laws in that manner in those
places, very uniformly from the period of their enactment. Nor
do I dwell on the hardship to honest, plain men being visited by
penalties for breaking laws when adhered to, as read or
interpreted erroneously to them by the public officers. That,
however, furnishes a strong reason, by means of con-
temporaneous and long construction, to show that such a
construction was the true one. The fact, too, of its open existence
for suh a length of time, rebuts any intent of citizens, by
conforming to it, to do what is wrong by such conformity, and
is another powerful argument in favor of adhering to this
construction. ... It becomes a very grave question, where
249. Id. (citations omitted).
250. See, e.g., Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1965) (relying upon McLaren v.
Fleischer, 256 U.S. 477,480-81(1921)); Logan v. Davis, 233 U.S. 613,626-27(1914); Swigart
v. Baker, 229 U.S. 187,199(1913); Surgettv. Lapice, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 48, 71(1850); see also
Hill v. Tohill, 80 N.E. 253,256 (1907) ("To sustain the appellee's contention now would be to
unsettle that which has for well-nigh 50 years been tacitly held by the courts of the state to
be the law, and would be to destroy property rights which have grown up and been
established on the theory that this statute was enforceable.").
251. See supra Part L
252. 27 F. Cas. 758 (C.C.D.R.I. 1848) (No. 16,145).
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law-makers and law-executors have long slept over conduct, as
if not a departure from the law, whether the construction should
suddenly be changed, and really innocent persons be insnared
and prosecuted by a new construction. Cotemporanea expositio
est optima et fortissima in lege.25
In short, a very common rationale for the use of common practice
in the interpretation of statutes is that public reliance is not
subverted.254 To assess the strength of the reliance rationale for
communis opinio, account must be taken of the retroactive nature
of judicial decision making. Although the Supreme Court has
decided, over the objection of Justice Scalia,2 5 that the Constitution
does not compel that judicial decisions be retroactive in all civil
256 257cases, prospective judicial decisions are rare. ' Because they
decide cases retroactively, courts ought to be sensitive about
unsettling the rules actually applied and accepted by the public and
the government.258 The Supreme Court has itself given express
253. Id. at 761-62 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
254. Professors Hart and Sacks add further strength to this rationale as a strong
indication of the proper interpretation of the statute by showing that many engaging in the
common practice are doing so contrary to their own interests:
[Common practice] was evidence of the understanding upon which people had
acted. Nor was the action the only circumstantial guarantee of its
trustworthiness. The trustworthiness was guaranteed, in addition, by the fact
that the action taken was against interest, on the part both of employees and
of employers. The employees had acted against interest in failing over a long
period of time to demand payment for the extra time. The employers had acted
against interest in exposing themselves to the claims for back pay and double
damages to which they would be liable if their understanding were mistaken,
as well as in agreeing in the first place to wage rates which need not have been
so high if take-home pay were to be increased by application of the rates to a
larger number of working hours.
HART & SACKS, supra note 112, at 1269-70.
255. See James Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 548-49 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (stating that the Constitution does not allow the Court to apply any decision
prospectively).
256. See Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86 (1993), in which a
majority of the Court held that a judicial decision in a civil case could not be applied in a
selectively prospective manner, but did not hold that the Court could not rule in a purely
prospective manner. The Court has held that decisions establishing new rules of criminal
procedure must be applied retroactively. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
257. See ESKIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 1, at 443 ("We are not aware of any statutory
case in which the Supreme Court has, since [1961], applied its ruling prospectively.").
258. Professor Jones made this point in a slightly different context:
The judge, when he must act as a law-maker to fill in the gaps of a statute,
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consideration to the consequences of retroactive decision making by
suggesting that a stronger rule of stare decisis ought to apply to
constitutional decisions "where reliance interests are involved"2 9
and by developing rules that provide for prospective decisions in
truly exceptional cases.2 The fact of public reliance in the
circumstances of common practice is thus properly seen as a
strong rationale for the use of the communis opinio canon. Although
reliance concerns do not arise when common practice initially
develops under a legislative scheme because the practice is new
and reliance interests are not implicated, a long-standing, well-
accepted practice 1 that has given rise to reliance should be
overruled retroactively only under exceptional circumstances. 82
exercises not original legislative power but delegated power, comparable to that
conferred upon administrative officers possessed of rule-making or subordinate
legislative authority. Each has the duty of implementing the general policy of
an enactment with detailed rules applying that policy to the infinite variety of
unforeseeable particular situations of fact. The circumstance that judicial
legislation is, in effect, retroactive, is but another reason for insisting upon the
necessity of its consistency with the general legislative policy.
Jones, supra note 63, at 973.
259. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) ('Considerations in favor of stare
decisis are at their acme in cases involving property and contract rights, where reliance
interests are involved; the opposite is true in cases such as the present one involving
procedural and evidentiary rules.") (citations omitted). Professor Radin made a similar
argument regarding judicial decisions interpreting statutes:
Since they are Anglo-American courts, they will not disregard precedent, but
will use it as strong courts do, namely, to avoid doing specific injustice, and not
merely to satisfy the requirement of logical consistency. A statute interpreted
"restrictively" for a period long enough to have induced men to adjust their
affairs to this interpretation, ought not suddenly to be interpreted "liberally,"
and vice versa. For precisely the same reason administrative interpretation,
continued long enough to cause this adjustment, should only be changed if the
"mischief' caused by the change would be less than the "mischief' of
maintaining the practice.
Radin, supra note 62, at 422.
260. See Chevron Oil Co. v. Hudson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1971) (defining factors for
deciding when a decision overruling a prior constitutional precedent should be applied only
prospectively).
261. Ifa practice changes overtime, then there is unlikelyto be anycommunisopinio and
the canon has no application.
262. See HART & SACKS, supra note 112, at 1291, who addressed the significance of
reliance when interpreting a statute with a common practice in its implementation:
Should a court be influenced by the degree to which a regulation or ruling of the
agency is likely to have received popular acceptance and induced popular
reliance? Note that the FCC's lottery regulations were challenged as soon as
promulgated and that the Treasury's position on jigsaw puzzles had not been
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
One consequence of the formalism of Justice Scalia, which rejects
communis opinio as a canon of construction, is that his decision
making method yields fundamental changes in the law that
undercut reliance.
D. Lawmaking Process
The final rationale for the use ofcommunis opinio by courts is not
one that courts have expressed clearly. The rationale, rather, is
implicit in the place of judicial decisions in the lawmaking process;
a place that courts and commentators have described in other
contexts when considering the development of the law. This section
begins by accepting the claimed rule-of-law value of formalism and
then analyzes how the failure of formalism to account for communis
opinio in interpreting statutes is inconsistent both with a rule-of-
law value and with clear statement rules applied under the
formalist approach. When formalists fail to account for common
practice in the interpretation of statutes, they subvert the
lawmaking process by the inconsistency that results. This section
then considers in the context of law development the extent to
which the use of the communis opinio canon may reduce the error
costs associated with the interpretation of statutes by courts.
Communis opinio provides strong grounds for an equitable
interpretation of a statute that shows the value of incrementalism
in judicial decision making.
consistent. But in the field of taxation, is not the settlement of disputed
statutory meanings extremely important and often essential before private
conduct is undertaken, not after? Perhaps for this reason, once the Bureau's
ruling have developed into a "settled" administrative practice, published for
public use, the courts have afforded them "great weight."
263. See Pierce, supra note 223, at 778 (noting that the Court's new textualism "allows
courts to ignore the context in which language is used, reliance interests created by decades
of contrary interpretations, or strong evidence that Congress intended a contrary meaning);
cf HART & SACKS, supra note 112, at 1305 (contending that a court should "especially" defer
to administrative practice when rejecting such a practice "would undoubtedly have a serious
unsettling effect upon the administration" of the law).
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1. Communis Opinio and Formalism's Rule-of-Law Claims:
Effecting Changes in the Law By Foreclosing Judicial
Consideration of Communis Opinio
The approach that a judge takes when interpreting a statute
reflects the judge's view of the role the judiciary plays in the process
of lawmaking.' At a general level, this is true of the interpretive
methodology-either formalist or nonformalist-utilized by the
judge.265 At a more specific level, a judge also reflects her view of
the role played by the judiciary in making law when she decides to
employ canons of construction, or rules of presumptive meaning, to
discern statutory meaning.2"
264. Cf SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 168-69 ("People trying to choose an interpretive
method must decide how to allocate power among various groups and institutions-indeed,
allocating power is what the choice of an interpretive method does."); id. at 174 ("[A] system
of legal interpretation is inevitably a function of decisions that are, broadly speaking,
political in character.").
265. As one commentator put it:
Selecting an interpretive methodology thus involves inevitable choices about
the institutional allocation ofpower. If courts give strong deference to agencies'
interpretations of the statutes they admini ter, that arrangement shifts law
elaboration authority away from judges and toward the executive. If courts
reject the authority of legislative history, they shift power away from
committees and bill sponsors and toward agencies and courts. If courts start
from an assumption of strong legislative supremacy in statutory cases, they
define themselves as subordinates of the legislature.
Manning, supra note 91, at 691-92 (1999) (footnotes omitted). Professor Sunstein makes the
related point that different actors in the process of lawmaking may properly employ different
interpretive methodologies given their varied roles:
Formalism may be good for the judiciary but bad for the administrative state,
and the judiciary would do well to recognize that possibility. Thus I have argued
that the greater accountability and specialization of agencies should permit
them to choose between formalist and nonformalist statutory construction, so
long as both are reasonable.
Sunstein, supra note 2, at 669.
266. Professor Eskridge has argued that, applied consistently, the canons of construction
might constitute an interpretive regime that both restrains judges and enables
the citizenry to predict how those judges will apply ambiguous as well as clear
statutes. Not least important, such an interpretive regime could serve
democracy values.., as legislators and their staffs could predict how different
proposed statutory language would be applied.
Eskridge, supra note 170, at 699 (footnote omitted); see also Eskridge & Frickey, supra note
129, at 86 ("[C]anons are designed, as we believe and the Court maintains they are, to create
a predictable interpretive regime").
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For Justice Scalia and other formalists, a critical value of that
interpretive method is that it furthers the rule of law, 87 thereby
ensuring that the court plays its appropriate conservative role
in the process of lawmaking.2 8 This conservatism is reinforced
by the canons typically employed by formalist judges.269
Generally, rule-of-law value is present in a legal system character-
ized by predictability and continuity in the overall legal regime,"
267. See WILLIAM D. POPKMN, MATERLS ON LEGISLATION: POLITICAL LANGUAGE ANDTHE
POLrnICAL PROCESS 174-75 (2d ed. 1997).
268. See Calabresi, supra note 197, at 482 ("[A] formal, self-contained, uncriticizable
system of law is conservative. It can't be changed.").
269. See Sunstein, supra note 2, at 653 ("In their modem incarnation, formalist
approaches to interpretation tend to share a number of positive and negative features,"
including"attention to canons of construction that help in limiting judicial discretion and in
uncovering meaning, and also to canons that reflect a distinct constitutional commitment or
otherwise give clear signals to Congress, but not to canons of interpretation that are not
time-honored or that embody controversial judgments about public policy.").
270. See id. at 650 ("[A] central formalist goal is to reduce the burdens of on-the-spot
decisions, above all by eliminating the need for the exercise ofdiscretion in particular cases,
and by making sure that law is as rule-like as possible, in a way that promotes predictability
for parties and lawmakers alike.") (footnote omitted); see also ESIKRDGE & FRICKEY, supra
note 1, at 515 (identifying "predictability of law" and "limiting judicial discretion" as
examples of "traditional rule of law values"). Professor Eskridge also describes the rule-of-
law value as follows:
An important value also widely accepted in our polity is the desirability of the
rule of law. The rule of law requires that statutes-whatever their source, be
it a representative legislature, a plebescite, or a monarch-be applied in an
objective, consistent, and transparent way to citizens and others subject to the
state's authority. Courts are the guardians of the rule of law, but also a threat
to it. An independent judiciary may make it more likely that a statute will be
applied in the same way tomorrow as today, and to the powerful and influential
as well as to the miserable and the obscure, but an independent judiciary also
poses a risk that judges will bend statutes to reflect their own political
preferences. The latter would undermine our ability to predict how a statute
will be applied, and the cynical among us expect that judicial bending would be
slanted in favor ofpersons or groups the judge identifies with or likes.
Eskridge, supra note 170, at 678.
When considering the rule-of-law value, it is important to recognize that the law involves
more than the statutory text:
Institutions wanting to know their legal obligations do not rely on isolated
texts; they look to practice, including agency rules and advice letters, judicial
decisions, congressional feedback, actions ofsimilarly situated parties, and the
reactions of the agency. If they find a stable equilibrium-private action
induced by vigilant agency enforcement that has been upheld repeatedly in
court-they will consider that 'law," whatever its relationship to the statutory
text.
Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 129, at 81.
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characteristics that are valued by both formalists27 and nonfor-
malists.272
For example, outside of the context of interpretive methodology,
Justice Scalia has also strongly advocated that courts have a
particular responsibility to ensure predictability in the law. 73 The
Court has also recognized that its own institutional commitment to
predictability by applying rules of stare decisis is a consequence of
the role played by the judiciary in the development of law, and that
other legal actors may not be constrained by stare decisis because
of their differing legal roles.7
271. See supra note 265; infra note 273.
272. Professor Eskridge, who is not a formalist on questions ofstatutory construction, has
written that "[t]he most useful rule of law test of the canons, and of more general theories
of statutory interpretation such as the new textualism, would be: Do they constrain judges
or make interpretation more predictable?" Eskridge, supra note 170, at 680; see also William
N. Eskridge & Phillip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN.
L. REV. 321, 339 (1990) ("Citizens ought to be able to open up the statute books and have a
good idea of their rights and obligations. When the statute seems plainly to say one thing,
courts should be reluctant to alter that directive.").
273. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808,834-35 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring), where
Justice Scalia offered the following response to a claim that the Courtes decision to overrule
a constitutional decision was contrary to stare decisis:
That doctrine [of stare decisis], to the extent it rests upon anything more than
administrative convenience, is merely the application to judicial precedents of
a more general principle that the settled practices and expectations of a
democratic society should generally not be disturbed by the courts. It is hard to
have a genuine regard for stare decisis without honoring that more general
principle as well. A decision of this Court which, while not overruling a prior
holding, nonetheless announces a novel rule, contrary to long and unchallenged
practice, and pronounces it to be the Law of the Land-such a decision, no less
than an explicit overruling, should be approached with great caution. It was, I
suggest, [the earlier contrary decision], and not today's decision, that
compromised the fundamental values underlying the doctrine of stare decisis.
274. For example, see Neal v. United States, in which the Court stated:
Our reluctance to overturn precedents derives in part from institutional
concerns about the relationship of the Judiciary to Congress. One reason that
we give great weight to stare deeisis in the area of statutory construction is that
Congress is free to change this Court's interpretation of its legislation....
Entrusted within its sphere to make policy judgments, the [Sentencing]
Commission may abandon its old methods in favor of what it has deemed a
more desirable approach to calculating LSD quantities. We, however, do not
have the same latitude to forsake prior interpretations of a statute. True, there
may be little in logic to defend the statute's treatment of LSD; it results in
significant disparity ofpunishmentmeted outto LSD offenders relative to other
narcotics traffickers. ... Even so, Congress, not this Court, has the
responsibility for revising its statutes. Were we to alter our statutory
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One context in which the Court's commitment to the rule-of-law
value of predictability has come to be reflected in its interpretive
methodology is the Court's practice of transforming a settled and
clear legal framework prior to the legislative enactment into a rule
that Congress must act clearly before a statute will be interpreted
to unsettle that prior legal regime. 5 To be sure, Justice Scalia, in
particular, has derided this methodology when it has relied on the
absence of legislative history to infer that Congress did not intend
to change settled law, rather than on a statutory text that Justice
Scalia found to be clear in its law-changing meaning.2 7 6 More
recently, however, Justice Scalia has written an opinion and joined
another that effectively employ a strong presumption in favor of
incremental legislative change to reject administrative actions by
the Federal Communications Commission vM and the Food and Drug
Administration. In these cases, a formalist majority determined
that the challenged agency actions effected a fundamental change
in the law and were unlawful in the absence of express permission
in the statute. The Court felt "confident that Congress could not
have intended to delegate a decision of such economic and political
significance to an agency in so cryptic a fashion."279 In sum, the
Court has relied in different contexts on a presumption based on
rule-of-law values to hold that an arguably broad, or ambiguous,
statutory text had not effected a fundamental change in the
background law.280
interpretations from case to case, Congress would have less reason to exercise
its responsibility to correct statutes that are thought to be unwise or unfair.
516 U.S. 284, 295-96 (1996) (citations and internal quotations omitted).
275. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
276. See id
277. See MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 231 (1994).
Interestingly, Justice Scalia's opinion in this case relied heavily on the etymology and
(related) dictionary meaning of the word, "modify," as referring to incremental change, see
id. at 225-28, to strike down an FCC regulation that made a "fundamental change in the
Act's tariff-filing requirement." Id. at 229. In the tobacco regulation case, Justice O'Connor,
writing for a majoritythat included Justice Scalia, viewedtheMCIcase as reflecting a strong
concern that settled law be unsettled by an agency only when the statutory text clearly
grants that broad authority. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120,160-
61 (2000). Of course, these cases implicate the constitutional nondelegation doctrine, as well
as the Court's presumption against fundamental change in settled law.
278. See Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 125.
279. Id. at 160.
280. See United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 63 (1998). The Court noted that
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The key criterion upon which ajudicial opinion may be evaluated
to assess whether it has conformed to rule-of-law values is whether
the decision can fairly be said to have changed the law. The issue
of whether a judicial opinion has changed the law, rather than
merely interpreted it, is not an issue that is often litigated as an
independent question."' In the recent Florida election cases,
282
however, the issue took on "momentous" historic significanceY In
an opinion concurring in the judgment to halt the Florida recount,
nothing in CERCLA purports to reject this bedrock principle [of corporations
law], and against this venerable common-law backdrop, the congressional
silence is audible. Cf. Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443
U.S. 256, 266-267 (1979) ("ISlilence is most eloquent, for such reticence while
contemplating an important and controversial change in existing law is
unlikely.").
For another case holding this view, see Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United
States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172-73 (2001) (citations omitted), in which the
Court stated:
Where an administrative interpretation of a statute invokes the outer limits of
Congress' power, we expect a clear indication that Congress intended that
result. ... Congress does not casually authorize administrative agencies to
interpret a statute to push the limit of congressional authority. This concern is
heightened where the administrative interpretation alters the federal-state
framework by permitting federal encroachment upon a traditional state power.
See generally Michael P. Healy, Textualism's Limits on the Administrative State: Oflsolated
Waters, Barkng Dogs and Chevron, 31 ENVT'L L. REP. (forthcoming 2001).
These clear-statement canons are arguably evolved forms of Blackstone's canon that
statutes in derogation of the common law should be construed narrowly and of the agency
nondelegation doctrine. Compare Wellington & Albert, supra note 164, at 1550, in which the
authors suggest that the modern trend toward nonformalism in statutory interpretation may
reflect a decision that one branch of government must consider directly the issue of public
policy being posed and identify the best available rule-of-law. In a case "involv[ing] questions
unforeseen or unforeseeable by the legislature," the authors argued that the question is
whether it is
not unrealistic to assume that the legislature decided these questions and
embodied its decision in the language of its enactment? If, under these
circumstances, a court decides a case because of a statute's plain meaning, its
decision will be one that rests upon abstract doctrine ofstatutoryinterpretation
that bears no necessary relationship to legislative purpose. Reliance on a plain
meaning rule, therefore, may result in a decision where neither court nor
legislature grapples with the substantive problem at issue.
Id.
281. But cf Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (holding that, except in special
circumstances, a new, i.e. changed, rule of constitutional criminal procedure will not apply
to cases that have become final before the new rule is announced).
282. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000); Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531
U.S. 70 (2000).
283. Gore, 531 U.S. at 145 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by the formalist Justices Scalia and
Thomas, decided that the Florida Supreme Court had changed
Florida's election law when that court purported to interpret the
meaning of a legal vote 4 and when that court, on December 8,
ordered a recount of all undervotes throughout the state. 5 In Chief
Justice Rehnquist's view, the question whether the court had
changed Florida election law had to be resolved because the
Constitution vests the authority to select presidential electors in
the state legislature"6 and because the Florida legislature had
provided for the election of electors by popular vote intending to
take advantage of the federal safe-harbor statute, which requires
that the procedures for selecting electors be defined prior to the
date of the election.2
7
Regarding the Florida court's order that undervotes throughout
the state be recounted, the plurality concluded that the Florida
Supreme Court had effected a change in the law because it had
failed to provide for the statutorily-mandated "appropriate" remedy
during the contest phase:
284. Id. at 120 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (arguing that court's definitionofa legal vote
"depart[ed] from the legislative scheme").
285. Id. at 122 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (arguing that court's decision "significantly
departed from the statutory framework in place on November 7, and authorized open-ended
further proceedings which could not be completed by December 12, therebypreventing a final
determination by that date").
286. As the Chief Justice wrote:
[Tihere are a few exceptional cases in which the Constitution imposes a duty
or confers a power on a particular branch of a State's government. This is one
of them. Article II, § 1, cl. 2, provides that "[elach State shall appoint, in such
Manner as the Legislature thereofmay direct," electors for President and Vice
President. (Emphasis added.) Thus, the text of the election law itself, and not
just its interpretation by the courts of the States, takes on independent
significance.
Id. at 112-13 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
287. The Chief Justice indicated:
As we noted inBush v. Palm Beach County CanvassingBd... . "Since [3 U.S.C.]
§ 5 contains a principle of federal law that would assure finality of the State's
determination if made pursuant to a state law in effect before the election, a
legislative wish to take advantage ofthe 'safe harbor' would counsel against any
construction of the Election Code that Congress might deem to be a change in
the law."
If we are to respect the legislature's Article II powers, therefore, we must
ensure that postelection state-court actions do not frustrate the legislative
desire to attain the "safe harbor" provided by § 5.
Id. at 113 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
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Surely when the Florida Legislature empowered the courts of
the State to grant "appropriate" relief, it must have meant relief
that would have become final by the cut-off date of 3 U.S.C. § 5.
In light of the inevitable legal challenges and ensuing appeals
to the Supreme Court of Florida and petitions for certiorari to
this Court, the entire recounting process could not possibly be
completed by that date.28
The plurality's conclusion that the Florida Supreme Court had
changed the law by changing the legal definition of a vote
established by the statutory scheme is more interesting because the
plurality relied principally on state-elections practice to define the
law prior to the Florida Supreme Court decision. 9 The plurality
discussed the actual instructions at polling places regarding the
marking of ba~lots, ° the interpretation of the Florida Secretary of
State, who is responsible for administering the State's elections,2 91
and the State Attorney General's description of previous contests
under the electoral regime. 2 Based on its view that the Florida
Supreme Court had rejected a consistent prior practice, the
plurality concluded that the Florida court had changed the law.
"For the court to step away from this established practice,
prescribed by the Secretary of State, the state official charged by
the legislature with 'responsibility to ... [olbtain and maintain
uniformity in the application, operation, and interpretation of the
election laws,' § 97.012(1), was to depart from the legislative
scheme."23 In sum, the Justices who comprised the plurality viewed
it as proper to rely on common practice to determine the content of
law.294
288. Id. at 121 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
289. Id. at 119 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
290. Id-
291. Id.
292. Id. at 120 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) ("The State's Attorney General (who was
supporting the Gore challenge) confirmed in oral argument here that never before the
present election had a manual recount been conducted on the basis of the contention that
'undervotes' should have been examined to determine voter intentV).
293. Id.
294. The plurality's view that there was an accepted elections practice against which to
gauge a change in law has been strongly criticized. See ISSACHAROFF, supra note 29, at 19-20.
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The principle that established practice, as well as statutory text,
has to be accounted for when deciding whether law has changed is
recognized in the cases-Bouie v. City of Columbia29 and NAACP
v. Alabama29 _discussed by the plurality to support its decision in
Gore. In Bouie, the Court reviewed the Supreme Court of South
Carolina's decision to extend the application of its criminal trespass
statute to a situation in which a person had lawfully entered onto
private property and was then told to leave but did not exit the
property.9 Significant reliance interests were present because the
state's courts had held that a lawful initial entry took the case
outside of the statutory criminal prohibition.2 ' This change in the
law effected by the state supreme court decision was held to violate
the Due Process Clause when the state criminal trespass statute
was applied to individuals who had lawfully entered a premises
prior to engaging in a civil rights sit-in.29
The Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in NAACP v.
Alabama.0 0 There, the Alabama Supreme Court had decided that
the review available on a writ of certiorari to that court was
narrower than previous practice had indicated.0 1 The Supreme
Court refused to accept the Alabama court's abandonment of long-
standing practice that had given rise to public reliance: "Novelty in
procedural requirements cannot be permitted to thwart review in
this Court applied for by those who, in justified reliance upon prior
decisions, seek vindication in state courts of their federal
constitutional rights." 02 The Court indicated, moreover, that the
nature of the conduct that constitutes practice must be known and
295. 378 U.S. 347 (1964).
296. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
297. Bouie, 378 U.S. at 362-63.
298. Id. at 362-63. See also id. at 359 ("The pre-existing law gave petitioners no warning
whatever that this criminal statute would be construed, despite its clear language and
consistent judicial interpretation to the contrary, as incorporating a doctrine found only in
civil trespass cases.") (footnote omitted).
299. See id. at 362 ("If South Carolina had applied to this case its new statute prohibiting
the act of remaining on the premises of another after being asked to leave, the constitutional
proscription ofex post facto laws would clearly invalidate the convictions. The Due Process
Clause compels the same result here, where the State has sought to achieve precisely the
same effect by judicial construction of the statute.").
300. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
301. Id. at 456.
302. Id. at 457-58 (citation omitted).
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understood by those engaging in the practice."'3 Alabama had
sought to explain that the earlier court decisions had stood for a
much more limited principle than the NAACP had sought to rely
upon.30 ' The Court responded that none of the prior state decisions
indicate that the validity of [court] orders [giving rise to
contempt] can be drawn in question by way of certiorari only in
instances where a defendant had no opportunity to apply for
mandamus .... [Tihe State now argues that this was in fact the
situation in all of the [decided] ... certiorari cases, because there
the contempt adjudications, unlike here, had followed almost
immediately the disobedience to the court orders. Even if that
is indeed the rationale of the Alabama Supreme Court's present
decision, such a local procedural rule, although it may now
appear in retrospect to form part of a consistent pattern of
procedures to obtain appellate review, cannot avail the State
here, because petitioner could not fairly be deemed to have been
apprised of its existence."'5
In short, the Supreme Court, including its current formalist
Justices, has viewed practice as establishing law against which a
change effected by a judicial decision can be measured. Indeed,
the Court in rare cases has concluded that such changes are
inconsistent with due process."° For jurists who seek to protect
303. Id. at 457.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. A recent book on the 2000 election controversy provides two cases in the elections
context in which courts held that deviations from prior practice were so significant that they
violated the Constitution. ISSACHAROFF, supra note 29, at 18. The authors describe the
factual findings in Roe v. Mobile County Appointing Board, 904 F. Supp. 1315, 1335 (S.D.
Ala. 1995), in which the district court decided a "longstanding, unequivocal, consistent state
practice" existed. Id. As a result, the court concluded that "the state Circuit Courts decision
to include [certain absentee] ... ballots [not previously allowed] was an 'abominable' post-
election change of practice that amounted to 'ballot-box stuffing' and was hence
unconstitutional." Id.
The authors also discuss Griffin v. Burns, 570 F.2d 1065 (1st Cir. 1978), in which the First
Circuit held that the Rhode Island Supreme Court violated the Constitution when it changed
state elections law notwithstanding public reliance on the previous state of the law. See
ISSACHAROFF, supra note 29, at 21-22. The state decisions conflicted with
longstanding, prior state practice; with the advice the relevant state
administrative officials provided before the election; with the actions of the
state legislature both before the state Supreme Court decision (acquiescing in
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rule-of-law values by ensuring predictability in the law, actual
practice that has become sufficiently established in the imple-
mentation of a statute so that it constitutes communis opinio
should provide a surer foundation for a presumptive statutory
meaning. In this context, the Court's presumptive rule of meaning
would be grounded in how the statute has actually worked, rather
than on determinations about the clarity of what Congress provided
regarding practices prior to the legislation. A judge who does not
account for the meaning of a statute as defined by communis opinio
risks imposing an unexpected change in the law on those who have
developed the settled practice. Particularly if a judge is a formalist
concerned about the rule of law, that judge should act in a con-
sistent manner to further that value by adopting the incremental
interpretation that conforms to how the law has developed as
evidenced by communis opinio.80°
In sum, common, accepted practice under a statutory scheme
importantly identifies the content of law, along with statutory text.
The failure of formalists to account for such practice in interpreting
statutes risks changing law and contradicts formalism's rule-of-law
rationale.
regular use of such [absentee] ballots in primaries) and after the decision
(amending the law to expressly permit such [absentee] ballots in primaries).
Id. at 22. The authors conclude that "[tihe key fact was the reliance of these [absentee] voters
on longstanding state practice: evidence had been introduced that, had they known absentee
balloting was not permitted, at least some of these voters would have gone to the polls and
voted in person." Id.
307. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 129, at 77. The authors criticize Justice Scalia's
formalism on the following grounds:
[T]he new, tougher version of textualism advocated by Justices Scalia and
Thomas exacerbates the tension between democracy and the rule of law and
ultimately serves as a cover for the injection of conservative values into
statutes. Insisting that statutory interpretation ignore legislative history and
adhering to dictionaries at the expense of common sense, the new textualism
is insensitive to the expectations of elected representatives. Maintaining that
clear statutory texts can trump longstanding practice and taking a dogmatic
and often bizarre view of what is clear, the new textualism sacrifices the
security and predictability associated with the rule of law.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also id at 81:
When the Supreme Court disrupts such a stable practice, ... it is not only
unsettling a specific legal regime, but is also raising the possibility of general
insecurity, in which neither private parties nor Congress can rely on settled
law. This weakens the Court's stabilizing role in statutory interpretation, and
undermines both democratic values and rule-of-law values.
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2. Communis Opinio and the Minimization of the Costs of
Judicial Lawmaking
So far in discussing this final rationale for the application of the
communis opinio canon, we have accepted formalist values. We now
consider how a failure to account for communis opinio undercuts
the legitimacy of any interpretive methodology by increasing the
costs associated with that methodology.
In a recent article, Professor Cass Sunstein assessed the claim
that formalism is the preferred methodology for statutory
interpretation."' 8 He concluded that the legitimacy of the formalist
method of interpretation cannot be established on the basis of
either constitutional principle0 9 or the principle of democratic self-
governance."x° Rather, in Professor Sunstein's view, the value of
formalism as an interpretive method depends upon the empirical
proof that the formalist method of interpretation yields better
interpretive results by minimizing combined decision and error
costs.311 In Professor Sunstein's view:
308. Sunstein, supra note 2.
309. See id at 662-63.
310. Id- at 665, where Professor Sunstein writes:
[T]he ideal of democratic self-government does not by itselfjustify formalism.
Many antiformalists are enthusiastic democrats too. They might invoke
legislative history on the ground that judges should consult the will of the
representatives of the people, rather than dictionaries or their own judgments,
to determine what vague words mean. They might think that canons of
construction should defeat literal language, on the ground that those canons
have support within the norms and traditions of the public as revealed over
time, orotherwisehave a good democratic pedigree-as loose, general language
from an occasionally inattentive Congress in, say, 1992, does not. This does not
mean that the antiformalists are right. It means only that the ideal of
democracy, or political legitimacy, cannot by itself support formalism.
311. Id. at 662. Professor Sunstein described these costs as follows:
Decision costs can be understood as the costs of finding out what the law is-a
cost faced by courts (attempting to discern the legal rule while deciding the
case) and by ordinary citizens (having to invest resources in figuring out the
content of the law). Error costs involve both the number of mistakes and the
magnitude of mistakes. On some empirical assumptions, a market-mimicking
default rule would minimize the relevant costs; on other assumptions, an
information-eliciting rule would do so. An independent point involves the
variability ofmistakes. It is possible, for example, that a nonformalist judiciary
will produce highly variable, even random errors, while a formalist judiciary
will produce the same number and magnitude of mistakes, but in a way that
involves no variability and a great deal of predictability.
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It seems most straightforward to defend formalism as a massive
or global information-eliciting default rule. Perhaps formalism
is likely to produce greater clarity from Congress, precisely
because it ensures that statutory language will be understood by
reference to its terms. Thus the notion that statutes will be
taken in their "plain meaning" might be understood as a way of
encouraging Congress to speak unambiguously.312
The value of employing formalism to impose such a default rule is,
of course, dependent on whether Congress has the interest and
ability to respond effectively to the inducement to speak clearly. 3
That broad empirical question of Congress's ability and practice in
responding to formalism is well beyond the scope of this Article,
although it bears mention that Professor Sunstein 14 and other
scholars 15 have raised serious doubts about Congress's law-writing
abilities. 31
6
Putting aside that broader question of formalism's effectiveness
in eliciting information, a strong rationale for the application of the
communis opinio canon is that the resulting interpretations should
result in lower decision and error costs. Relying on communis opinio
to establish a statute's presumptive meaning should reduce decision
costs because those subject to written law will be more confident
that acting in accordance with common practice will be accepted as
Id. at 647.
312. Id. at 655.
313. Id. at 642. Professor Sunstein wrote:
In a legal system in which the legislature is extremely careful before the fact,
and highly responsive tojudicial interpretations afterthe fact, formalism might
well make sense, especially if a nonformalist judiciary would create confusion
and make blunders of its own. By contrast, a nonformalist approach would
make sense in a legal system with an excellent judiciary and a legislature that
is both careless and inattentive.
Id.; see also id. at 656 ("If a formalist judiciary does not in fact elicit information from
Congress-if Congress is relatively unresponsive to the formalist signals-the case for
formalism, as a global information-eliciting default rule, is much weakened.").
314. See id, at 659 ("Congress is not in the business of responding rapidly and regularly
to particular cases in which interpretations, literal or otherwise, tend to misfire.").
315. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 129, at 77.
316. Resolving that empirical question also seems to depend on evaluating the effect of
congressional inaction. When judges rely on congressional acquiescence or inaction as
positive evidence of congressional intent, they are commonly criticized by other judges and
commentators.
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lawful by courts. For these actors, there will be less need to assess
whether the written law can be read to mandate a practice that is
inconsistent with accepted practice, and their decision costs will be
thereby reduced.
Employing communis opinio to fix a statute's presumptive
meaning should also be effective in reducing error costs. Because
judicial decisions almost always have a retroactive effect,"17 when
they impose error costs, such costs are likely to be high, 8' and a
court's caution about damaging the broad legal fabric is well
warranted. 19 The application of the communis opinio canon will
mean that courts are less likely to unsettle established practices
and impose rules based upon "a dogmatic and often bizarre view of
what is clear."320 Although courts have not used "error-cost
reduction" to explain their reliance on communis opinio, when the
Supreme Court has employed the canon its reasoning is quite
compatible with this rationale.
3 21
317. See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
318. Professor Radin raised similar concerns about the costs of judicial decisions:
Since they are Anglo-American courts, they will not disregard precedent, but
will use it as strong courts do, namely to avoid doing specific injustice, and not
merely to satisfy the requirement of logical consistency. A statute interpreted
"restrictively" for a period long enough to have induced men to adjust their
affairs to this interpretation, ought not suddenly to be interpreted "liberally,"
and vice versa. For precisely the same reason administrative interpretation,
continued long enough to cause this adjustment, should only be changed if the
"mischief" caused by the change would be less than the "mischief" of
maintaining the practice.
Radin, supra note 62, at 422; see also supra note 257.
319. See United States v. Macdaniel, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 1, 14-15 (1833), in which the Court
stated:
To attempti to regulate, by law, the minute movements of every part of the
complicated machinery of government would evince a most unpardonable
ignorance on the subject. Whilst the great outlines of its movements may be
marked out, and limitations imposed on the exercise of its powers, there are
numberless things which must be done, that can neither be anticipated nor
defined, and which are essentialto the proper action of the government. Hence,
of necessity, usages have been established in every department of the
government, which have become a kind of common law, and regulate the rights
and duties of those who act within their respective limits. And no change of
such usages can have a retrospective effect, but must be limited to the future.
320. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 129, at 77.
321. See United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459,472-73 (1915). The Court had the
following response to an argument that it should interpret a statute contrary to the common
practice:
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In sum, employing communis opinio as a canon of construction is
likely to minimize the costs of judicial lawmaking, regardless of
whether a court employs a formalist or nonformalist method of
interpretation.3 2
2
CONCLUSION
This Article has assessed the Supreme Court's statutory
interpretation debate by examining Justices Stevens's and Scalia's
attitudes toward and application of the ancient canon of communis
opinio. By considering the history of communis opinio, the
requirements for its application, the effect of its application, and
the purposes of this canon, the Article has sought to define the
contours and stakes of the Court's statutory interpretation debate.
This close scrutiny of interpretive method and interpretive rules
has clarified several important points. The application of the
communis opinio canon enhances the commitment to contextual
meaning in a way that promotes the orderly development of the
It may be argued that while these facts and rulings prove a usage, they do not
establish its validity. But government is a practical affair intended for practical
men. Both officers, law-makers and citizens naturally adjust themselves to any
long-continued action of the Executive Department-on the presumption that
unauthorized acts would not have been allowed to be so often repeated as to
crystallize into a regular practice. That presumption is not reasoning in a circle
but the basis of a wise and quieting rule that in determining the meaning of a
statute or the existence of a power, weight shall be given to the usage
itself-even when the validity of the practice is the subject of investigation.
Id. The Court defended its decision in the following similar terms in Peabody v. Stark, 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) 240,243-44 (1872):
In the absence of a clear conviction on the part of the members of the court
on either side of the proposition in which all can freely unite, we incline to
adopt the uniform ruling of the office of the internal revenue commissioner,
holding that the distiller is not liable under the eighty per cent. clause, until a
copy of the survey in which the tax is assessed has been delivered to him as
provided in section ten. It is made to appear to us in a very satisfactory manner
that such has been the unvarying rule of that office since the act went into
effect, and while we do not hold such ruling as in general obligatory upon us,
we are content to adopt it in this case for the reason already mentioned, as well
as for its obvious fairness to the government and to the distiller.
See also Udallv. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1,16-18 (1965); Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United
States, 288 U.S. 294, 314-15 (1933); Fairbank v. United States, 181 U.S. 283, 323 (1901)
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
322. Cf SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 178 ("[Alny system of constitutional interpretation
must be closely attuned to the risks of judicial discretion. Rules of interpretation should be
designed to minimize those risks.").
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law. Communis opinio provides an effective check on the autonomy
of formalism, which may give statutory text an abstract,
ungrounded meaning. Moreover, the Article has shown how Justice
Scalia, by deriding the relevance and the application of this canon
in appropriate statutory cases, must surrender his claim that
textualism is grounded in rule-of-law values, because ignoring the
weight of communis opinio gives the formalist license to interpret
statutes in ways that unsettle a long-standing and wide-spread
understanding, and undermine the orderly development of law.
Perhaps the most important value of the canon in establishing a
contextual understanding of positive law is that, when properly
applied, it promotes coherence in statutory interpretation and
eschews ungrounded and unanticipated judicial readings of
text-readings that have the effect of changing the law,
notwithstanding the claimed meaning of the text. 23
323. Cf id. at 186 ("Judges are not specialists in the many subjects that call for
interpretive judgments, and they have little electoral legitimacy. It follows that in general,
courts should attend closely to the legislature's views, so as to recognize the law-making
primacy of the legislature and simultaneously to discipline their own decisions.").
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